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ABSTRACT

Previous general aviation (GA) accident studies showed that decision errors were
more associated with fatal GA accidents than other kinds of human errors, and weatherrelated accidents, especially continued visual flight rules (VFR) flight into instrument
meteorological conditions (IMC), remained the major cause of fatal GA accidents. Thus,
finding the underlying causes of GA pilots’ decision errors and continued VFR flight into
adverse weather conditions are needed to reduce weather-related GA accidents as well as
fatal GA accidents.
Causal factors and hypotheses of weather-related GA accidents show that
knowledge, experience, motivation, and weather information frequently have been
referred as causal factors of weather-related GA accidents. Among causal hypotheses,
situation assessment and risk assessment hypotheses have been cited frequently as the
causes of weather-related GA accidents.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effects of weather recognition training
on GA pilots’ situation assessment and tactical decision making under gradually
aggravating weather conditions. To meet this purpose, WeatherWise and an X-Plane 9
flight simulation program has been used. WeatherWise is a computer-based weather
training program developed by Wiggins et al. (2000) to improve GA pilot weather-related
decision making, and was approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for
free public use.
Pilot situation assessment is a pilot’s understanding of a current flight state, and
was evaluated in terms of weather assessment and risk assessment. Weather assessment is
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the pilot’s ability to recognize or estimate the changes in visibility, ceiling, and weather
condition. Risk assessment is the understanding of the risks associated with flying in
adverse weather conditions, and was measured in terms of risk perception and risk
tolerance using the Hazardous Event Scale, personal weather minimums, and the
Aviation Safety Attitude Scale. Pilot situation assessment was measured by a postexperiment questionnaire.
Pilot tactical decision making is in-flight judgment, and was evaluated in terms of
decision accuracy and decision confidence. Decision accuracy was evaluated by
measuring the distance that a pilot has flown from an optimal divert point to an actual
divert point, and the distance a pilot has flown into adverse weather conditions. Decision
confidence is the pilot’s confidence level in making diverting decisions when the pilot
encounters adverse weather, and was measured by subjective rating method.
Findings of the study indicated that the WeatherWise training group exhibited
significantly higher weather assessment as measured by ceiling estimation ability and
decision accuracy as measured by flown distance into adverse weather condition than the
control group, but no significant differences were found in their risk assessment and
decision confidence. Although the effects of weather training on the risk assessment were
not significantly different between the two groups, participants in the WeatherWise
training group was more conservative toward flying into adverse weather condition than
the control group.
It was hypothesized to find a positive relationship between pilots’ situation
assessments and their tactical decision-making because situation assessment forms a basis
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for decision making; however, positive relationship was found only between pilots’
ceiling estimation and flown distances into adverse weather in this study. Thus, it can be
concluded that the weather training was effective at least in part to pilot situation
assessment and tactical decision making. In addition, considering the weather training
was just one-time 30 minute training, long-term effects of weather training should be
conducted to find further relationship between pilot situation assessment and tactical
decision making.
The results of this study can be expanded not only to GA pilots but also to
commercial airline pilots and military pilots for various reasons. First, all pilots are
expected to acquire weather recognition skills and knowledge to ensure a safe flight
regardless of their flight types because the nature of weather condition changes is
dynamic and hard to predict during the flight. Second, although those aircrafts are well
equipped with navigation aid systems and weather display radar, they do not provide realtime weather information, and they sometimes malfunction.
In conclusion, it is expected that this study will be helpful for GA pilots to
understand the effects of weather recognition training on weather decision-making, and
eventually help them assess a situation correctly and make a timely in-flight decision. It
is believed that this study will help to establish a sound foundation for weather training
program and has the potential to reduce weather-related GA accidents by implementing
weather training during flight training.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Overview of General Aviation (GA) Accidents
General aviation (GA) accidents represented 70 to 90% of all aviation accidents
(ATSB, 2007; Lenne et al., 2008; Li & Baker, 2007), as well as 73% of the fatal
accidents that occurred in 2007 (AOPA, 2008). However, little attention has been paid to
GA accidents as compared to commercial aviation accidents and military aviation
accidents (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003b), because the majority of the world’s air traffic
fall into the GA category, and most GA operations were for personal flight (39.4%).
2000
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Figure 1.1 Annual Numbers of General Aviation Accidents (NTSB, 2010)
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The development of aviation industry technology and navigational aid systems
enabled pilots to fly safer when compared with pilots who flew 50 years ago, and the
portion of GA accidents has decreased slightly during the last 10 years. However, the rate
of fatal GA accidents is almost the same (Figure 1.1; AOPA, 2008; NTSB, 2010).
According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report (2005), 6%
of all GA accidents were weather-related, and 70% of them were fatal accidents that led
to approximately 25% of all GA pilot fatalities (Ball, 2008). This finding was similar to
what Li and Baker (2007) found, as they showed that even though the portion of adverse
weather conditions caused only 9% of GA accidents, it claimed 28% of pilot fatalities.
Most often, these weather-related fatal GA accidents resulted from pilots’ decision to
continue visual flight rules (VFR) flight into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC)
(Figure 1.2; AOPA, 2009). Thus, the causes of GA accidents as well as weather-related
GA accidents need to be understood clearly to reduce GA pilot fatalities.
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Figure 1.2 Types of Weather Accidents in 2008 (AOPA, 2009)
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Causes of GA Accidents
Previous GA accident studies were focused mostly on either human error or the
causal factor approaches. Human errors have been deemed to be contributing factors to
70-80% of all aviation accidents (Adams & Thompson, 1987; Dinges, 1995; Nagel, 1988;
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2007), as well as 70-85% of the GA crashes (Sawyer & Shappell,
2009; Li et al., 2001; Li and Baker, 2007; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003b), and can be
classified into skill-based errors, decision errors, perception errors, and violations.
Shappell and Wiegmann (2003b) analyzed 14,571 GA accidents that occurred
between 1990 and 1999 in the United States, and found that skill-based errors (80%) were
the most prevalent, followed by decision errors (36%), violations (32%), and perceptual
errors (less than 10%) (Figure 1.3). Although the portion of skill-based errors were the
highest, decision errors were related more to fatal GA accidents (Adams & Thompson,
1987; Jensen & Benel, 1977; O’Hare, 1990).

Figure 1.3 Percentages of GA Accidents by Each Unsafe Act
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The Australian Transportation Safety Bureau (ATSB) accident data analysis
(2007) from 1993 to 2002 showed similar results. The portions of the aviation accidents
were the highest in skill-based errors (87%), followed by decision errors (30%),
violations (6%) and perception errors (5%). However, the portion of decision errors and
violations in the fatal accidents were much higher than that of non-fatal accidents.
Overall, reducing skill-based errors might be the most effective way to reduce the entire
accident rate; however, decision errors and violations appeared to be more related to the
fatal aviation accidents and continued VFR flight IMC (Giffin & Rockwell, 1987). Thus,
it can be assumed that pilot’s good decision making and judgment is crucial to reducing
fatal aviation accidents (Barnett et al., 1987; O’Hare, 1992).
Besides the human error approaches, there have been causal factor approaches to
understand GA accident studies. Giffin and Rockwell (1987) asserted that pilots’
continued VFR into adverse weather conditions ranked as the highest cause for all GA
accidents, and often led to spatial disorientation, which is the second major cause of the
fatal accidents. Surveys of GA pilots (Hunter, 1995; O’Hare & Chalmers, 1999) also
showed that VFR flight into IMC is a major safety concern in GA, and revealed that
approximately one out of four GA pilots experienced VFR into IMC, with 4% having
done so multiple times (Pauley et al., 2008).
Using NTSB statistics from the timeframe of 1982 to 1999, Craig (2001) found
12 frequent causes of GA accidents, three of which coincided with studies done by other
researchers. The three factors are: continued VFR flight into IMC (AOPA, 2008; Coyne
et al., 2005; Crognale & Krebs, 2008; Goh & Wiegmann, 2001a; Knecht et al., 2003;
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O’Hare & Smitheram, 1995; Pauley et al., 2008; Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003a), loss of
situation awareness (SA) (Adams & Thompson, 1987; Endsley & Garland, 2000;
Molesworth et al., 2006), and pilot health and physiology (Higdon, 2009; Salazar, 2007;
Taneja & Wiegmann, 2002).
Beard and Geven (2005) assessed 68 Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
reports between 1995 and 2005, and found that poor weather assessment, distraction, and
overestimation of piloting capabilities were the major factors to aircraft upset. Among
them, poor weather assessment was the major causal factor that led to GA ASRS reports.

Figure 1.4 Types of Pilot-Related GA Accidents (AOPA, 2008)
The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) accident trends and factors
(2008) also showed that weather caused the highest portion of the fatality in GA
accidents (Figure 1.4), and continued VFR flight into IMC was the main cause of
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fatalities among weather-related accidents (Batt & O’Hare, 2005; Coyne et al., 2008;
Craig, 2001; Li & Baker, 2007; Wiggins, 1999).
In summary, previous GA accident studies showed that decision errors were
associated more with fatal GA accidents than other kinds of human errors, and weatherrelated accidents, especially continued VFR flight into IMC, remained the major cause of
fatal GA accidents (Figure 1.5). Thus, finding the underlying causes of GA pilots’
decision errors and continued VFR flight into adverse weather conditions are needed to
reduce weather-related GA accidents as well as fatal GA accidents.

Figure 1.5 GA Accident Studies

Weather-Related GA Accidents
Previous human error studies and causal factor studies of GA accidents showed
that decision errors and weather-related accidents were the two main causes of fatal GA
accidents. Therefore, it is important to learn why GA pilots commit such frequent
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weather-related accidents. Specifically, do pilots’ decision errors affect weather-related
accidents?
Pilots need to follow flight rules to fly an aircraft in a certain weather condition.
The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) established guidelines for pilots about what the
predominant flight visibility should be, and how far the airplane should remain away
from the ceiling. The ceiling is the lowest layer of clouds, and is reported as above
ground level (AGL) (Coyne et al., 2008). Visibility is the greatest distance at which an
object can be seen and is reported as status mile (SM) (International Civil Aviation
Organization , 2002). Cloud ceiling and visibility minimums vary, depending on the
airspace in which the pilots are flying. In general, if the ceiling is more than 1,000 feet
AGL, and the visibility is three miles or more, the weather is VFR. However, if the
ceiling is less than 1,000 feet AGL, and the visibility are less than three miles, the
weather is instrument flight rules (IFR). This classification can be further categorized into
marginal visual flight rules (MVFR) and low instrument flight rules (LIFR), according to
the weather minimums. Table 1.1 shows the weather minimums by flight category (FAA,
2006).
Table 1.1 Ceiling and Visibility Minimums by Flight Category
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However, because of the limitations of time and money required to get the IFR
qualification, many GA pilots are only VFR qualified. Thus, when VFR-only qualified
GA pilots encounter IMC, they are not allowed to fly into IMC. Still, many GA pilots
continue VFR flight into instrument flying weather condition for various reasons, and 75%
of pilots who were involved with VFR into IMC accidents were not qualified for IFR
flight (AOPA Air Safety Foundation, 1996). Many factors and hypotheses have been
suggested to explain such pilots’ behaviors.
Burian et al. (2000) analyzed 276 ASRS incident reports involving in-flight
encounters with weather, and asserted that even though pilots notice deteriorating
weather cues early, they tend to stick to their original flight plan. These authors termed
such behaviors as plan continuation events (PCE), and suggested four factors that could
cause such actions as lack of weather knowledge and experience, lack of correct weather
information, time pressure, and organizational or social pressure.
Capobianco and Lee (2001) examined 1,520 GA accidents’ data from 1995 to
1998, and found that ―VFR into IMC‖ and ―flight into adverse weather‖ were two
common causes of weather-related GA accidents. They also found that the weatherrelated causal factors associated with the fatal accidents were low ceiling, fog, wind, and
night.
O’Hare and Owen (2002) examined the GA air crash data in New Zealand
between 1988 and 2000, and proposed over-confidence, faulty risk perception, lack of
awareness, and sunk costs as the causes of fatal GA crashes. The sunk cost hypothesis
predicts that pilots who encounter adverse weather late in the flight are more likely to
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continue flying than pilots who encounter adverse weather early in the flight, because the
former might have spent more time, money, and effort. Thus, the greater the sunk cost,
the further pilots will fly through adverse weather (Knecht et al., 2005). In their study,
pilots who were involved in weather-related GA crashes flew closer to the destination
airport as compared with pilots who were involved in non-weather-related crashes, which
indicated that the sunk cost hypothesis can be more explanatory of weather-related GA
accidents.
Weather-related GA accidents were not only associated with an individual causal
factor, but multiple causal factors and their interaction effects. Knecht et al. (2003)
investigated the effects of ground visibility (three levels), cloud ceiling (two levels), and
financial incentive (two levels) on GA pilots’ voluntary takeoff into adverse weather.
Sixty participants were instructed to fly under VFR weather conditions, but there were no
statistically significant main effects between the three factors. Instead, there were
significant interaction effects between the three factors, which indicated that
combinations of these factors might drive a pilot to make a decision. Knecht et al. (2005)
tested 60 GA pilots’ willingness to takeoff into adverse weather conditions using a highfidelity flight simulator. These authors classified the causal factors of weather-related
decision errors into interior factors and exterior factors. Interior factors were related to
the pilot’s perceptual and cognitive factors, such as knowledge, risk perception,
overconfidence, and the sunk cost effect. Exterior factors included environmental factors
such as visibility, ceiling, and financial incentive. The results indicated that a pilot’s
takeoff in adverse weather conditions was more predictable when the interactive effect of
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visibility and ceiling was considered together than when the linear effect of each factor
was considered separately.
Wiegmann et al. (2008) also asserted that many accidents were not associated
with a single factor alone, but with a combination of factors. They analyzed previous
aviation accidents and incidents involving VFR into IMC, and found that weather-related
causal factors were involved with a lack of weather knowledge and experience to fly
safely in adverse weather, failure to complete pre-flight planning, limited weather
evaluation skills, poor risk assessment, overconfidence, and poor in-flight planning.
Some researchers suggested hypotheses to explain the causes of weather-related
GA accidents. Goh and Wiegmann (2001b; 2002a) conducted a comprehensive review of
the NTSB GA accident statistic data between 1990 and 1997, and suggested four
hypotheses to explain a pilot’s continued VFR flight into IMC: situation assessment, risk
perception, decision framing, and social pressure. They also found the top 10 causal
factors of VFR flight into IMC, three of which were weather conditions (70%), terrain
conditions (25%), and spatial disorientation (24%).
Beard and Geven (2005) suggested three reasons for the pilot’s risky behavior of
taking off in adverse weather conditions: underestimation of the risk level, lack of
experience, and frequency gambling. Frequency gambling refers to one’s expectant
attitude of success in a risky situation. In aviation, pilots sometimes are motivated to fly
in an adverse weather after seeing other pilots’ success in taking off, although one pilot’s
successes do not guarantee another’s success in takeoff.
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Sawyer and Shappell (2009) divided 60 participants into three equal groups of 20
based on their flight experience: non-pilots (no flight experience), low-time pilots (less
than 500 flight hours), and high-time pilots (greater than 500 flight hours). They assessed
how experience and training affect pilot weather decision-making accuracy, response bias,
and visual scan paths. To meet this purpose, the authors showed all participants 10
randomly-chosen weather pictures taken in the sky, and asked them whether they would
continue to fly, or divert the flight if they encountered the weather condition in the
pictures. Participants then completed the WeatherWise training program, and measured
visual scan paths using an eye tracker while seeing another 10 randomly-selected weather
pictures. Finally, all participants viewed the first 10 weather pictures again, and were
asked the same questions. The findings showed that weather training did not improve
participants’ decision accuracy, but there was significant shifts of conservation bias
towards not continue flying into adverse weather.
In summary, many causal factors and hypotheses of weather-related GA accidents
have been suggested in previous studies (Table 1.2). It can be seen that interior factors,
such as knowledge, experience, and motivation, and exterior factors, including weather
information, frequently have been referred as causal factors of weather-related GA
accidents.
Among causal hypotheses, situation assessment and risk assessment hypotheses
have been cited frequently as the causes of weather-related GA accidents. This
classification is in line with Coyne et al.’s (2008) study, which presented situation
assessment and improper motivation as the major causes of GA accidents. Improper

11

motivation or misplaced motivation can be classified as the lack of risk assessment of
pilots, in that pilots sometimes are overconfident in their abilities and do not fully
consider the associated risks of flying in bad weather conditions. Most of the causal
factors and hypotheses mentioned were suggested from accident analysis studies, and
only a few were suggested from empirical studies.
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Table 1.2 Causes of Weather-Related GA Accidents
Factors

Hypotheses

Causes
Authors
Knowledge

Skills

O’Hare (1990)

O

O

Burian et al. (2000)

O

Experience

O

Latorella &
Chamberlain (2001)

Motivation

Flight
Planning

O

O

Goh & Wiegmann
(2002a)

Personality

O

Weather
Information

Wiggins & O’Hare
(2003b)
Beard & Geven (2005)

O

O

O

O

O

O

Coyne et al. (2005)
Knecht et al. (2005)

O

O

O

Sawyer & Shappell
(2009)

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

Ball (2008)
Wiegmann et al.
(2008)

O

O

O

O

O

Decision
framing

Sunk
cost

O
O

O

O
O

O

O

O
O

O
O

O

O

Risk
assessment

O

O’Hare & Owen
(2002)
Adams et al. (2002)

Situation
assessment

O
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O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O
O

O

Purpose
This study addresses issues concerning the effects of weather recognition training
on GA pilots’ situation assessment and tactical decision making when encountered
adverse weather conditions. For this purpose, WeatherWise was used as a weather
training program and the X-Plane 9 flight simulation program was used to measure the
pilots’ situation assessment and in-flight judgment in a dynamic and uncertain flight
environment.
WeatherWise is a computer-based weather decision-making training program
developed Wiggins et al. (2000), and the program was approved for free public use by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The validity of WeatherWise was examined by
Wiggins and O’Hare’s empirical study (2003b), in which the authors found that those
who received training with the WeatherWise program could improve timely weatherrelated decision making during VFR flight.
However, previous studies dealing with the WeatherWise training program had
several limitations. First, the weather conditions used in WeatherWise were clearly
different from each stage, and quite easy for a pilot to find the optimal divert point. Thus,
it is not clear whether WeatherWise is effective in a gradually aggravating weather
condition. Second, pilots did not actually control the flight, but just saw the weather
conditions, and chose an optimal divert point. This might lack the reality of flying, and
truly may not represent the workload imposed on pilots. Including Wiggins and O’Hare’s
(2003b) study, previous studies using the WeatherWise program showed participants
short video clips (Coyne et al., 2008) or static images (Ball, 2008; Sawyer & Shappell,
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2009; Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003a) to simulate flight environment, and participants were
asked to choose either to continue or to divert the flight at seeing the video clips or static
images. Third, the concept of situation assessment was not defined clearly, and was used
interchangeably with situation awareness (Fracker, 1988), decision accuracy (Sawyer &
Shappell, 2009), self-assessment of hazard attitude (Wiggins et al., 1995), or estimation
of the weather conditions (Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003b; Wiegmann et al., 2002). To solve
the above-mentioned limitations and simulate one step close to the real flight
environment, pilots’ situation assessment and tactical decision making were measured
using a questionnaire and the flight simulation program in a gradually aggravating
weather condition. Table 1.3 shows detailed measurement methods of situation
assessment and tactical decision making.

Table 1.3 Situation Assessment and Tactical Decision Making

Situation
Assessment

Categories

Explanation

Weather Assessment

Estimation of visibility, ceiling, and
weather condition

Risk Assessment

Decision Accuracy
Distance flying into adverse weather
condition
Decision Confidence

Questionnaire

Risk perception and risk tolerance
Distance from an optimal divert point to an
actual divert point

Tactical
Decision
Making

Method

Confidence level in making divert decision

Flight
simulation
program

Questionnaire

Pilot situation assessment is the pilot’s understanding of a current state, and was
measured in terms of weather assessment (Coyne et al., 2008; Goh & Wiegmann, 2001a;
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Sawyer & Shappell, 2009) and risk assessment (Coleman & Marks, 1999; Hunter, 1995;
2002b; Latorella & Prabhu, 2000).
Weather assessment is the pilot’s ability to recognize or estimate the changes in
visibility, ceiling, and weather condition, and was considered to measure pilots’ situation
assessment because pilots may not fly into adverse weather if they have read the weather
conditions correctly. Risk assessment is the understanding of the risks associated with
flying in adverse weather conditions, and was measured in terms of risk perception and
risk tolerance. Risk assessment was included in the pilot situation assessment categories
because poor risk assessment may lead pilots to press on into adverse weather (Jensen &
Benel, 1977; O’Hare, 1990). Risk assessment was measured using the Hazardous Event
Scale (HES; Hunter, 1995), personal weather minimums, and the Aviation Safety
Attitude Scale (ASAS; Hunter, 1995). Situation assessment and tactical decision making
were measured by a post-experiment questionnaire.
Pilot tactical decision making is associated with pilot’s in-flight decision to
continue flight (Coyne et al., 2008), and was evaluated in terms of decision accuracy and
decision confidence (Bliss et al., 2005; Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003). Decision accuracy was
evaluated by measuring the distance that a pilot has flown from an actual divert point to
an optimal divert point, and the distance a pilot has flown into adverse weather condition.
Decision confidence is the pilot’s confidence level in making diverting decision when he
encounters adverse weather. Decision confidence was considered because pilots’
situation assessment and decision confidence are required to improve pilot decision
making (Lichacz & Farrell, 2005). Decision confidence was evaluated using subjective
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rating method after the experiment. It was expected that the pilots’ confidence level in
making the decision to divert in adverse weather conditions will be high if they receive
weather recognition training and correctly recognize the deteriorating weather condition.
Whereas strategic decision making is forward thinking made on the ground in preflight planning, tactical decision making is real-time judgment made in-flight. It was
assumed that this study will find a positive relationship between a pilot’s situation
assessment and his tactical decision making.
In this study, using the flight simulation program, GA pilots made a simulated
cross-country flight from the North Central West Virginia Airport (KCKB) in West
Virginia to the Louisa County/ Freeman Field Airport (KLKU) in Virginia as long as they
assumed that they did not violate VFR conditions in gradually deteriorating weather
conditions. When pilots encountered IMC, they were not allowed to continue the flights,
and should divert to the alternative airports that they think optimal. The experiment was
terminated when a pilot began to divert to an alternative airport, lost control of the
aircraft, or crashed on the terrain.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

General Aviation (GA)
GA Classification
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) classifies civil aviation into three
groups (Figure 2.1): GA, major airlines, and commuter air carriers and air taxis. The GA
classification includes all non-commercial aircraft flying under Title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations Part 91 (14 CFR Part 91). The major airlines include commercial aircraft
operating under 14 CFR Part 121, and the commuter air carriers and air taxis consist of
scheduled and on-demand commercial flights of aircraft with 30 or fewer seats operated
under 14 CFR Part 135 (Li et al., 2003; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003b).
The NTSB (2006, p.2) defined GA as, ―any civil aircraft operation that is not
covered under 14 CFR Parts 121, 129 (foreign air carriers and foreign operators of U.S
registered aircraft), and 135, commonly referred to as commercial air carrier operations.‖

Figure 2.1 Aviation Classification
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In short, GA refers to all flight other than military and scheduled airline flights,
both private and commercial (AOPA, 2008). The GA flights range from gliders and
helicopters to non-scheduled cargo jet flights, and comprise the largest part of aviation
activities (Li & Baker, 2007).

Phases of Flight
Phases of flight can vary according to the mission of the airplane. Roskam (1998)
and the FAA (1999) categorized flight phases of GA flight into takeoff, climb, cruise,
descent, and landing. Detwiler et al. (2006) categorized GA flight phases into taxi,
takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, approach, and landing. The AOPA (2008) categorized the
flight phases into takeoff, climb, cruise, maneuvering, descent/approach, and landing.
Table 2.1 shows the previous categorization of GA flight phases.

Table 2.1 Categorization of GA Flight Phases
Authors

Categorization

AOPA (2008)

Takeoff, climb, cruise, maneuvering, descent/approach, landing

Detwiler et al. (2006)

Taxi, takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, approach, landing

Schvaneveldt et al.
(2001)

Takeoff, climb, cruise, transition to cruise, descent, approach, landing

FAA (1999)

Takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, landing

Roskam (1998)

Takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, landing
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Summarizing previous studies, GA flight phases can be broken down into five
sequential phases, which are takeoff, climb, cruise/maneuvering, descent/approach, and
landing (Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2 Flight Phases for General Aviation
Previous aircraft accident studies mostly focused on the takeoff and landing
phases because a pilot’s mental workload is the highest during them, and accordingly,
many aircraft accidents happen (Dambier & Hinkelbein, 2006; Detwiler et al., 2006; Di
Nocera, 2007; Wilson, 2002). However, GA accident data (Adams & Thompson, 1987;
Benbassat et al., 2005; O’Hare, 1999) showed that cruise and maneuvering phases took
most of the fatal aircraft accidents, and should be regarded as more important than other
flight phases (Figure 2.3).
Cruise phase is a condition of flight in which pilots maintain constant heading,
altitude, and speed (FAA, 1999). The GA pilots’ attention might decrease as they fly in
cruise phase for a long time while hearing loud and monotonous engine noise. Also, GA
pilots generally spend most of the time in the cruise flight phase checking navigation
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information, and weather information, and accordingly, the cruise flight phase has a high
chance of aircraft accidents for GA pilots (Coyne, 2004).
The vulnerability of the cruise phase in GA was shown in GA accident analysis
studies. Capobianco and Lee (2001) analyzed 1,520 instances of GA accidents from 1995
to 1998 and found that 63% of fatal weather accidents occurred during the cruise phase.

Figure 2.3 Mean Total and Fatal GA Accidents during 1995 to 1998
Similarly, Taneja and Wiegmann (2001) analyzed 70 civil aviation mid-air
collision accidents that occurred between 1994 and 1999, and they found that the
maximum damages of mid-air collisions occurred during cruise phase. The AOPA (2008)
data also showed that cruise and maneuvering phases were among the highest safetycritical flight phases.
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This was not different in questionnaire studies. O’Hare and Wiggins (2004)
defined critical flight event as any situation in which unplanned action is needed to
prevent incidents or accidents. They analyzed 162 surveys from Australia, New Zealand,
and the United States, and found that pilots reported the cruise phase as the most frequent
flight phase (45.6%) in which incidents or accidents occurred during critical flight event.
Previous weather-related empirical studies found that weather also began to deteriorate in
the cruise phase to simulate the real-world flying environment (Ball, 2008; Baron, 2011;
O’Hare & Owen, 2002; Wiegmann et al., 2002).

GA Accident Studies
In general, GA accident rates are higher than commercial aviation accident rates
or military aviation accident rates, because GA pilots have more exposure to risk. The
GA pilots flew in and out of airports that are less equipped with navigation aids and
emergency equipment (Craig, 2001), and they generally are less experienced than
commercial airline pilots or military pilots. The causes of GA accidents have been
examined by accident data analysis studies, empirical studies, and questionnaire studies.

Data Analysis Studies
Goh and Wiegmann (2001b) analyzed the data from 409 VFR into IMC GA
accidents between 1990 and 1997, and found 10 contributing factors that were associated
with GA pilots’ continued VFR flights into adverse weather. They categorized the GA
causes into aircraft, facility, environment, flight crew, and other person. The analysis
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showed that the top three causes were weather conditions, terrain conditions
(environment category), and spatial disorientation (flight crew category).
Li et al. (2001) examined around 30,000 aviation accidents that occurred between
1983 and 1996, and found that the IMC were associated more with pilot error regardless
of operation type (commercial aviation, commuter/air taxi, and GA). These authors
asserted that external factors such as weather or terrain are more associated with pilot
error than internal factors such as experience.
Shappell and Wiegmann (2003a) analyzed 16,510 GA accidents that occurred
between 1990 and 1998 using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
(HFACS), and found that skill-based errors (73.5%) encompassed the highest portion of
human errors in controlled flight into terrain accidents followed by decision errors (35%),
violations (14.3%), and perception errors (7.7%). Wiegmann et al. (2005) analyzed
14,436 GA accidents that occurred between 1990 and 2000, and found similar results.
These authors found that the odds ratio of violations associated with fatal accidents was
four times higher than that of nonfatal accidents (Wiegmann et al., 2005). The results are
quite consistent with Goh and Wiegmann’s (2002a) study, which showed that 76% of
VFR flight into IMC accidents involved pilots’ intentional violations to continue flights
into adverse weather.

Empirical Studies
Goh and Wiegmann (2001a) conducted an empirical study to find factors that lead
to pilots’ continued VFR flights into IMC. Based on Jensen’s judgment model (1995),

23

they examined factors including situation assessment, risk perception, motivation, and
decision framing. These authors divided the participants into two groups (continue/divert
VFR flight into IMC), and compared the possible contributing factors of continued VFR
flight into IMC. The results showed that visibility estimate, risk-taking behavior
frequency, skill, and judgment ratings were the most important factors in predicting pilots’
continued VFR flights into IMC. Pilots who continued flying showed higher ratings of
their skill and judgment, and they were more willing to take risks than those who diverted
in IMC.
Wiggins and O’Hare (2003b) recruited 66 GA pilots and divided them into two
groups. One group took a cue-based decision-making training called WeatherWise, and
the other group did not. The authors assessed the self-reported ratings of the perceived
importance of weather cues and the performance in terms of timely decision making after
the experiment. The results showed that both the perceived importance of critical weather
cues and the performance level were higher for the WeatherWise training group than the
control group, which indicated that WeatherWise could improve pilots’ timely decisionmaking ability during simulated cross-country flights.
Wiggins (2006) assessed GA pilots’ performance on various dimensions in a
simulated cross-country flight. Thirty-four pilots flew five legs of flight in visual
meteorological conditions (VMC). Pilot performance was measured in terms of pilot selfreport, experimenter observation, and flight simulator data. Performance dimensions were
composed of aircraft control, track, altitude, fatigue management, and communication.
The results suggested that performance differences between pilots were not due to recent
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flight experience, nor qualifications, but due to the stages (leg 1 to 5) of flight. In this
study, pilot performance was lowest in the fifth leg of flight, which indicated that the
combination of fatigue and mental demands may affect the pilots’ capacity to precisely
control the aircrafts.
Inadvertent VFR flight into IMC was not just a major problem of fixed-wing GA.
Crognale and Krebs (2008) investigated 20 civilian helicopter pilots’ flight performance
using a flight simulator in an inadvertent VFR flight into IMC. In their scenario, the
visibility rapidly decreased near zero, with ceilings less than 100 feet, and participants
were allowed to take whatever actions they needed to cope with the changing weather
conditions. Each participant flew six missions at given speeds and altitudes, and
performance data were collected regarding aircraft attitude, flight performance, and pilot
efforts. The findings showed that there were significant differences in pilots’ performance
when flying in VMC and IMC.

Questionnaire Studies
O’Hare (1990) developed the Aeronautical Risk Judgment Questionnaire (ARJQ)
to assess GA pilots’ perceptions of their abilities, willingness to take a risk, hazard
awareness, and risk judgment. Forty-four licensed pilots flew a VFR flight into a
marginal VFR weather condition. The ARJQ showed that young and currently active
pilots showed a higher likelihood of accident involvement when compared with other
pilots. The results implied that age and experience are associated with high risk and
personal invulnerability.
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Hunter (2002b) developed two instruments to measure pilots’ risk-taking behavior:
risk perception and risk tolerance. Each instrument consisted of a series of short scenario
descriptions that represent risky situations and activities. In his study, 402 pilots
completed the study exercises on the FAA-sponsored website. The findings showed that
higher levels of experience and qualifications are related to lower levels of risk
perception. These results support the zero risk theory (Summala, 1988), which suggested
that as self-confidence increases, perceived risk diminishes to the point of zero. In other
words, experienced pilots may feel that there is no risk at all.

Frequent Causes of GA Accidents
Weather-related
According to the NTSB report (2009), there were 4,159 weather-related accidents
(21.3%) out of the 19,562 accidents between 1996 and 2005, and 3,617 of them (86.6%)
were GA operations. The NASA ASRS report (2007) analysis showed that the major
weather factors related to the GA accidents were ceiling lowering ceiling, reduced
visibility, and deteriorating weather conditions (Figure 2.4).
Latorella and Chamberlain (2001) classified GA pilots into three groups
according to their cross-country experience, and presented them with three weather cues,
respectively: VMC, IMC, and Graphical Weather Information System (GWIS)augmented IMC. The results showed that the GA pilots who were faced with VMC and
GWIS-augmented IMC had better confidence ratings, perceived performance, and
information sufficiency than those who were faced with IMC. Overall, this study
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emphasized the benefits of the GWIS to improve pilots’ SA. However, there were some
limitations to their study. First, the numbers of participants were too small. The authors
classified six GA pilots into three groups, and only two pilots were assigned to each
group. This small number of participants could lower the power of the data, and may lack
representativeness for each group. Second, the participants did not perform flights by
themselves; a NASA test pilot served as the pilot in command (PIC). Considering the fact
that flying is complex and dynamic task, assessing pilots’ decision making and SA while
they are seated in passenger’s seat could weaken the reality of flying environment.

Figure 2.4 Types of GA Weather Encountered (NASA ASRS, 2007)
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Adams (2002) developed a Decision Making Styles (DMS) instrument, a nextgeneration aeronautical decision-making training material, to identify the characteristic of
high-risk pilots. The DMS is a simplified five-variable model that is composed of
information resource management, influence of somatic or negative inner signals,
reliance on gut reaction, less military training, and strong feeling of time pressure. The
author analyzed 4,000 pilots’ surveys, and found that high-risk pilots are more likely to
feel time pressure, expose themselves to unsafe flying situations, misdiagnose their
abilities, and not review alternative options. Adams et al. (2002) also suggested that the
aforementioned variables should be used to do an initial screening test for high-risk pilots.
Wiegmann et al. (2002) studied the relationship between GA pilots’ situation
assessment and flight experience, and measured the time and distance a pilot traveled
before diverting to an alternative airport. The GA pilot encountered IMC either early or
late in the flight, and the authors studied how the location at which the pilot encounters
adverse weather could affect the pilot’s decision to continue the flight into adverse
weather. The authors found no significant correlations between pilots’ flight experience
and their situation assessments in terms of estimates of visibility and cloud ceilings.
Although the authors wanted to adopt the situation assessment hypothesis, they could not
reveal the exact role that experience played in affecting a pilot’s weather decision, and
failed to examine the situation assessment hypothesis.
Wiggins and O’Hare (2003b) examined the validity of the WeatherWise program
by using both a self-report assessment and a performance assessment. Participants were
allowed to see short video clips and choose an optimal divert stage to an alternative
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airport. For the self-report assessment, pilots were asked to choose as many weather cues
as they thought affected the continuation of the flight. For the flight performance
assessment, pilots selected either to continue or divert the flight within ten seconds after
seeing a short video clip. The findings showed that participants who were trained with the
WeatherWise made better, timelier decisions when compared with control group.
Coyne et al. (2008) focused on pilot weather assessment study, because pilots’
assessments of weather conditions are related to their decisions to continue flight or not.
The authors conducted weather assessment in terms of estimation of the ceiling (height
AGL), visibility (statute miles), and distance to the airport, using the short video clip.
They showed participants five seconds of out-the window video using an overhead
projector. The findings indicated that there were interaction effects between a pilot’s
estimate of ceiling and visibility in making a decision to continue flight.
Ball (2008) assessed the impact of training and graphical weather display on GA
pilots’ weather-related decisions. The author measured the time to the initial/final
decision for a pilot to encounter a storm, the proximity to the storm, the number of
weather inquiries, and the post-experiment ratings. He classified the participants into
tactical users and strategic users (Beringer & Ball, 2004). Tactical users were those who
attempted to fly to the destination, and strategic users were those who navigated at a safe
distance. The results showed that both training and graphical weather display enabled
pilots to make a decision sooner and maintain a safe distance from the storm.
Sawyer and Shappell (2009) conducted a study to understand the effects of
experience and training on pilots’ ability to identify adverse weather conditions using eye
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tracking method. The authors divided pilots into three groups: non-pilots, low-time pilots,
and high-time pilots, and showed participants static pictures, and asked them whether
they would continue the VFR flight when they encountered the weather in the picture.
The authors assessed pilots’ weather identification accuracy, response bias, and visual
scan paths. The results showed that the WeatherWise training group showed a significant
conservative response bias toward not to continue flying when they were confronted with
adverse weather after being trained with the WeatherWise program, which indicated that
the weather training program is related positively with weather decision making.
However, the role of experience on weather decision making was not clear in their
study. Although eye tracking data showed a decrease in the number of fixations and
fixation durations as expertise increased, the authors did not find a significant effect
between flight experience and weather identification accuracy. Overall, WeatherWise
was deemed useful in preventing pilots from flying into adverse weather conditions.
However, what is required of GA pilots to assess weather conditions is to earn the skills
to perceive and distinguish VFR conditions from IMC precisely, rather than to divert
upon encountering the adverse weather.

Loss of Situation Awareness (SA)
Pilots may fly into an adverse weather because they may not perceive the
deteriorating weather condition precisely (Batt & O’Hare, 2005). The SA of a pilot helps
him to know and understand the current situation as well as predict how things will
change in the future. Situation awareness was first introduced in the aviation domain,
which is involved in the operation and control of a complicated system in a dynamic
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environment (Uhlarik, 2002), and has been extended to other domains, such as air traffic
control (Endsley, 1998), driving (Kass et al., 2007, Ma & Kaber, 2005), command and
control (Salmon et al., 2006), and the health care system (Gaba et al., 1995; Wright et al.,
2004). Although SA is a difficult concept to define, there have been studies defining SA
in aviation domains (Table 2.2; Adams et al., 1995; Gaba et al., 1995; Sarter & Woods,
1991; Vidulich, 1995).

Table 2.2 Definition of Pilot Situation Awareness
Authors

Definition

Adams & Thompson

The accurate perception of the factors and conditions that affect the

(1987)

aircraft and the flight crew during a specific period of time

Regal et al.

An integrated understanding of factors that will contribute to the safe

(1988)

flying of the aircraft under normal or abnormal conditions

Sarter & Woods

All accessible knowledge which can be integrated into a coherent picture,

(1991)

and if required, assess and cope with a situation

Endsley
(1995a)

The perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of
time and space, the comprehension of their training, and the projection of
their status in the near future

ICAO

One’s ability to accurately perceive what is in the cockpit and outside the

(2002)

aircraft

Adams and Thompson (1987) defined SA as, ―the accurate perception of the
factors and conditions that affect the aircraft and the flight crew during a specific period
of time,‖ and asserted that pilots who have a high level of SA are safer than those who
have a low level of SA (p.11). Similarly, the International Civil Aviation Organization
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(ICAO) (2002) defined SA as, ―one’s ability to accurately perceive what is in the cockpit
and outside the aircraft‖ (p.9). Regal et al. (1988) asserted that SA means that a pilot has
an integrated understanding of factors that will contribute to the safe flying of the aircraft
under normal or abnormal conditions. Sarter & Woods (1991) emphasized the
significance of temporal dimension of SA, and defined SA as, ―all accessible knowledge
which can be integrated into a coherent picture, and if required, assess and cope with a
situation‖ (p.55).
Endsley (1995a) conducted a comprehensive study on SA, and defined SA as ―the
perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future‖
which is by far the most widely-cited definition of SA (p.36). According to her SA model
(1995b; Figure 2.5), there are three hierarchical levels for achieving SA: perception of the
element (Level 1), comprehension of the current situation (Level 2), and projection of
future status (Level 3). Level 3 SA can be achieved through Levels 1 and 2. To achieve
SA, an individual must rely on perception and pattern recognition abilities (Durso &
Gronlund, 1999; Kass et al. 1991), attention and working memory (Gugerty, 1997), and
long-term memory (Endsley, 1995b).
Perception of element (Level 1 SA) is fundamental. Basic perception of important
information increases the chances of forming a picture of the situation. For example, a
pilot should perceive weather cues correctly to understand what those weather cues mean.
Comprehension of the current situation (Level 2 SA) involves more than perception, and
includes multiple pieces of information and the determination of their relevance to the
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goal. For a GA pilot, his goal might be a timely and safe arrival to the destination.
Projection of future status (Level 3 SA) is the highest level of understanding of the
situation. This ability allows for timely decision making, something on which
experienced operators heavily rely. When a pilot suddenly encounters severe weather, he
should decide whether to divert or to continue into the adverse weather to meet the goal.

Figure 2.5 SA Model in Dynamic Decision Making (Endsley, 1995b)

In general, previous SA studies in the aviation domain have shown that pilots who
have high level of SA showed better decision making and higher performance (Doane et
al., 2004) than pilots who have low level of SA. Bustamante et al. (2005) examined pilots’
workload, SA, and trust, in weather systems during critical weather events. The authors
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used the NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX; Hart & Staveland, 1988) to measure the
workload, and the Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART; Jones, 2000) to
measure the SA. The results showed that the pilots’ workload increased significantly and
SA decreased as they flew closer to the weather event. Overall, previous SA studies tried
to enhance pilots’ SA to improve pilots’ decision making.

Pilot Health and Physiology
Most causal factors studies related to pilot health and physiology entailed fatigue,
alcohol or drug use, and pilot incapacitation (Craig, 2001). Among them, fatigue was
regarded as the most influential physiological factor of aviation accident. Fatigue is an
expected and ubiquitous aspect of life, and can be resolved with a nap or by stopping the
activity that caused the fatigue. However, if the person is involved in critical safety
activities such as operating a motor vehicle, piloting an aircraft, performing surgery, or
running a nuclear reactor, the consequences of fatigue can be disastrous.
Fatigue was defined as, ―a condition characterized by increased discomfort with
lessened capacity to respond to stimulation, and is usually accompanied by a feeling of
weariness and tiredness‖ (Salazar, 2007, p.1). Causes of fatigue range from boredom to
circadian rhythm disruption to heavy physical exertion (Caldwell & LeDuc, 1988;
Caldwell, 2004). Symptoms of fatigue include irritability, impatience, impaired
communication and decision making, forgetfulness, increased reaction times, reduced
attention, diminished memory, and withdrawn mood (Dinges, 1995; Taneja, 2007).
Akerstedt (2000) indicated that fatigue is the largest identifiable and preventable
cause of accidents in transport operations. A review of data from mishaps and hazard
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reports between 1990 and 2008 showed that fatigue was the highest aeromedical causal
factor in naval aviation (Figure 2.6; Davenport & Lee, 2007; Davenport, 2009). The
NTSB also has cited fatigue as a significant contributing factor in aviation accidents, and
has included it on their ―Most Wanted List‖ of actions needed by federal agencies
(Galloway & Hanks, 2008). Accident statistics, reports from the pilots themselves, and
operational flight studies all showed that fatigue is a growing concern within aviation
operations (Caldwell, 2005).

Figure 2.6 Aeromedical Causal Factors (Davenport, 2009)

Decision Making Models
People make decisions every day. Those decisions could be related to routine
tasks, such as eating breakfast, or complex tasks, such as a pilot choosing an alternative
airport when confronted with adverse weather conditions. Medin and Ross (1992)
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asserted that decision making involves risk, and a good decision maker effectively
assesses the risks associated with each option. In other words, decision making is to
select one option from a number of alternatives while considering the risks involved with
them. In making a decision, people use multiple strategies that depend on a wide variety
of task demands (Castellan, Jr., 1993).
The decision-making process generally can be represented in three phases:
acquiring and perceiving relevant cues, generating and selecting situation assessments
about the meaning of the cues, and planning and selecting choices based on the costs and
values of different outcomes (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002b; Wickens et al., 2004). These
three phases are similar to Endsley’s (1995a) dynamic decision-making process, in which
the three phases are awareness of the situation, making the decision, and performance of
the action (Figure 2.5). However, in each phase, limited human cognitive resources can
bring out biases.
In the first phase, primary cue and anchoring bias can occur. In general, pilots put
more weight on the first cues they receive than cues that they receive later. This often
leads pilots to anchor on situation assessment. In short, information processed early could
be the most influential to pilots’ decision making.
In the second phase, overconfidence can take place. Pilots tend to believe that
they are correct more than they actually are, and they make decisions quickly. As a result,
pilots might be less likely to prepare for the alternative choices in pre-flight planning and
in-flight planning.
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Finally, framing bias can happen in the action selection phase. Framing bias
explains that a pilot makes a decision depending on, ―how the problem is represented and
what frame is used to interpret the situation‖ (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002a, p. 818). A wellknown framing bias is sunk cost bias (Arkes & Hutzel, 2000). Sunk cost bias predicts that
pilots who encounter adverse weather late in their flights will be more likely to continue
flying than pilots who encounter adverse weather early, because people tend to incur
greater risk when losses are involved; this is why sunk cost bias is also called escalated
commitment bias (Bailey, III, et al., 2007).
The decision making model can be categorized into the classical decision making
model, the naturalistic decision making model, the information processing model, and the
recognition-primed decision making model, which is a kind of naturalistic decision
making model.

Classical Decision Making Model
The traditional approach to understanding individual decision making is the
classical decision making model, which is also known as the rational economic model
(Huczynski & Buchanan, 2001). This model assumes that a decision maker is completely
rational and has available all the information needed, as well as all of the alternatives, and
both are considered when making a decision. A decision maker will select the optimum
choice through the following strictly-defined sequence of steps in the classical decision
making model: problem identification, identification of objectives with respect to
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problem, identification of alternative course of action, evaluation of alternatives,
selection of the best alternative, and implementation (Figure 2.7; Heracleous, 1994).

Figure 2.7 Classical Decision Making Model

However, this model has several limitations to its use in the field. First, the
classical decision making model is based on the assumptions that decision makers are
objective and consider all the possible alternatives, which is quite unrealistic in practice
(Li, 2008), because it may take too much time to consider all the alternatives.
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Additionally, a decision maker’s emotions also may influence his behavior and choices
(Barnes & Thagard, 1996). Second, this model does not consider the contextual factors,
such as domain knowledge or experience in the decision-making process (Bailey, III, et
al., 2007), which have been regarded as important human competence factors that can be
acquired through training.

Information Processing Model
Wickens and Flach (1988) proposed an information processing model to explain
the flow of information within the human brain (Figure 2.8). This four-stage model
(Parasuraman et al., 2000) consists of short-term sensory store (STSS), perception,
decision and response selection, and response execution stages.

Figure 2.8 Information Processing Model (Wickens & Flach, 1988).
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The STSS is a temporary mechanism for prolonging the representation of the raw
stimulus evidence for a short period of time after the stimulus has terminated physically.
It is pre-attentive stage and decays rapidly. Raw STSS relayed to the brain is then
interpreted through the perception stage. Perception is the awareness of the elements
through physical sensation, and includes the stimulus of the sensory organs through the
identification of that stimulus. The decision and response selection stage is also known as
the cognitive stage, and this determines the appropriate action. This stage generally
requires greater time and attention when compared to the perception stage, because
cognitive operations are carried out by working memory and long-term memory.
Working memory is a system that must maintain information until its translation into
action. Long-term memory is our storehouse of facts about the world and about how to do
things. In the cognitive stage, processes begin to operate with the goal of determining the
appropriate action. Finally, the response execution stage requires the coordination of the
muscles for controlling motion to assure that the chosen goal is obtained correctly
(Wickens & Hollands, 2000).

Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) Model
The NDM model was first introduced in 1989, when researchers began to wonder
how experienced people make decisions in natural environments or in simulations
(Zsambok, 1997). Unlike the classical decision making model, the NDM model
considered real-world settings that often are uncertain in regard to time constraints. For
example, natural flight environments are mostly dynamic in their characteristics and
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aeronautical decisions are made under time pressures and uncertain situations (Orasanu &
Connolly, 1993). The NDM model asserts that decision makers rely on their experience
to rapidly assess the situation, and generally do not consider all the alternatives and make
their responses accordingly (Bailey, III, et al., 2007). This aspect makes the NDM model
different from the classical decision making model. Kaempf and Orasanu (1997)
concluded that situation assessment is important to make correct and timely decisions,
and needs to be supported through decision aids and training.

Recognition-primed Decision Making (RPD) Model
Similar to the NDM model, Klein (1995) suggested a recognition-primed decision
making (RPD) model to know how people, especially experts, make quick and effective
decisions when faced with complex situations. In this model, the decision maker is
assumed to generate a possible course of action, compare it to the constraints imposed by
the situation, and select the first course of action that is not rejected (Klein, 1998). The
RPD model highlights three aspects of operation settings: the quality of the decision
maker’s situation assessment, his/her experience level, and the use of recognition rather
than an analytical decision process (Mosier & Fischer, 2010). Thus, the RPD model
explains that experts do not go through an exhaustive evaluation of all the possible
solutions, but rather focus on shortcuts or workable options that produce fast results using
their domain knowledge. Thus, according to the RPD model, the options that experts
choose may not necessarily be the best option (Klein, 1995).
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Experts also draw on a vast background of experience to avoid typical decisionmaking bias (Wickens et al., 2004). On the contrary, non-experts rely on more deliberate
decision-making processes, and go through exhaustive searches and comparisons of
alternatives (Orasanu, 1997). For these reasons, the RPD model functions well under time
pressure and when there is only partial information, and goals are poorly defined.
Klein (1995) asserted that the RPD model, focused on situation assessment rather
than deciding on one option, is superior to other decision making models. He also
asserted that people use situation assessment to generate a possible course of action, and
they use mental simulation to evaluate that course of action.
The RPD model assumes that time pressure does not affect performance, because
experts can use rapid pattern matching induced from past experience (Wickens et al.,
2004). Thus, the RPD model is used to explain expert pilots’ decision-making processes
in naturalistic environments, and could be adopted to explain pilots’ weather-related
decision making when considering the uncertainty and dynamic weather changes of
flying environments.

Decision Errors
Pilot Decision Errors
Aviation accident analysis showed that about half of the civil aviation accidents
were attributed to pilots’ faulty decision making (Jensen, 1982). Driskill et al.’s (1997)
study also suggested that pilots’ decision errors are one of the two most frequently cited
causes of GA accidents. Pilots’ decision errors result from a variety of breakdowns,
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biases, or tendencies in human information processing (i.e., faulty aerial situation
assessments, aircraft status assessments, environment assessments), and they are more
likely to produce fatalities in aviation (Wickens et al., 2005).
Pilots’ decision making should be considered different from general decision
making, because most pilots’ decisions are made in three-dimensional space under
uncertainty and with time-constraints. To reduce pilots’ decision error, decision aid
devices, such as GPS or navigation systems, have been developed and widely utilized
among pilots.
It can be assumed that a single-pilot operated GA flight might be more dangerous
than a multi-crew operated GA flight. Considering most GA pilots flew without the
presence of a co-pilot, it is important to know which factors cause a GA pilot’s decision
errors, especially under adverse weather conditions.

Weather-Related Decision Errors
Weather decisions involve judgmental decisions, which are a knowledge-based
activity as opposed to skill or rule-based activity (Giffin & Rockwell, 1987). Beringer
and Ball (2004) conducted a study on how varied Next-Generation Radar (NEXRAD)
weather display data resolution could affect a pilot’s visual performance data (how long
he assessed the data), and the flight performance data (the distance to the severe weather,
and the deferred decision time to continue the flight). The findings indicated that the
high-resolution NEXRAD images are more likely to encourage pilots to navigate
between adverse weather areas than the low-resolution NEXRAD images, which left
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pilots with the expectation that they could fly around or between heavy precipitation
areas.
Ball (2008) assessed the impact of training and graphical weather display on GA
pilots’ weather-related decisions. The training consisted of 38 pages of guidance of the
proper usage of the Flight Information Systems Data Link. The weather display was
presented with NEXRAD systems and the Meteorological Aerodrome Report (METAR).
The NEXRAD is a network of Doppler weather radar systems and is provided by the
National Weather Service (NWS), and METAR is the international standard code format
for hourly surface weather observations. The author classified participants into tactical
users and strategic users. Tactical users were those who attempted to fly to destinations
through small holes in the storm, and strategic users were those who avoided hazardous
weather by navigating at a safe distance. He measured a time to the initial/final decision
at encountering the storm, the proximity to the storm, the number of weather inquiries,
and the post-experiment ratings. The results implied that both training and graphical
weather displays would enable pilots to make decisions sooner and maintain safe
distances.

Causal Factors
Previous studies on the causes of weather-related GA accidents showed that
frequently-cited individual causal factors are interior factors, such as knowledge, skills,
experience, motivation, and personality, and exterior factors, such as flight planning and
weather information (Table 1.2). Foushee and Helmreich (1988) also listed knowledge,
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skill, attitude, personality characteristics, and physical states as individual factors that
affect performance.
Group causal factors of weather-related GA accidents have been studied by
researchers as well. Baron (2011) conducted an empirical study on the effects of social
pressure and team communication on GA pilots’ decision making to determine the group
factors. However, only individual factors were considered in this study, because this
study is focused on a single-pilot controlled cross-country GA.

Knowledge
To accurately diagnose the salient weather cues in the operational environment,
weather knowledge is important (Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003b), and a lack of weather
knowledge frequently has been cited as the cause of weather-related GA accidents.
According to the situation assessment hypothesis, a lack of knowledge about weather
conditions might cause GA pilots to risk entering into adverse weather conditions.
Giffin and Rockwell (1987) conducted an empirical study using a computer aided
weather test (CAWT), and found that the poor decision making group had low quiz
scores in weather knowledge items.
Wiggins and O’Hare (2003b) investigated the effect of cue-based weather training
on the GA pilots’ perceived importance of weather cues and flight performance. The
results showed that those who received weather training initiated a diversion at or before
the optimal decision point during the flight when they encountered IMC.

Skills
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Although recently built airplanes are equipped with weather display radar such as
NEXRAD, it does not provide real-time weather information (Bailey, III, et al., 2007)
and sometimes may not function correctly. Additionally, pilots are expected to acquire
weather recognition skills through weather decision-making training, to ensure a safe
flight regardless of the flight type, because weather condition changes so dynamic and
hard to predict during in-flight. Decision skills can be trained (Kaempf & Orasanu, 1997),
and Hunter et al. (2000) developed a computer-based training program to improve pilots’
cue recognition skills in weather-related decision making.

Experience
Experience long has been known to have a positive relationship with pilots’ SA
(Doanne et al., 2004; Endsley, 1999) and decision making (Beringer & Ball, 2004;
Chamberlain & Latorella, 2001; Wiggins et al., 2002). In previous empirical studies,
pilots were classified either experts or novices based on their total flight hours (Table 2.3;
or cross-country flight hours (Table 2.3).
In empirical studies, dealing with pilot weather decision making, however,
classifying pilots based on cross-country flight experience was regarded more as
representative of evaluating experience in decision-making tasks (O’Hare & Wiggins,
2004; Wiggins et al., 2002), because pilots who flew only the local area may not have
had many chances to make decisions when they encountered adverse weather, despite
that their overall flight time may have been high.
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Table 2.3 Classification of Pilots Based on Flight Experience
Authors

Classification

Latorella & Chamberlain
(2001)

Low (135) – Medium (379) – High (738)

Wiggins et al.
(2002)

Novice (less than 100) – Intermediate (100
to 1000) – Expert ( more than 1000)

Wiggins & O’Hare
(2003a)

Novice (less than 1000) – Expert (more than
1000)

Coyne et al.
(2008)

Novice (less than 1000) – Expert (more than
1000)

Wiggins & Henley
(1997)

Inexperienced (less than 300) – Experienced
(more than 300)

Beringer & Schvaneldt
(2002)

Novice (less than 500) – Experienced (more
than 500)

Sawyer & Shappell
(2009)

Low(less than 500) – High (more than 500)

Criteria

Cross-Country
Flight Hours

Overall Flight
Hours

In Wiggins and Henley’s (1997) study, notable differences in pre-flight decision
making were found between experienced and inexperienced flight instructors as to
whether to authorize a student pilot to conduct an initial, solo, and/or cross-country flight.
The findings showed that the inexperienced flight instructors were more cautious than
experienced instructors in decision making. Whereas the experienced flight instructors
changed their decisions according to the accessibility of weather information, there were
no changes among the inexperienced flight instructors. Goh and Wiegmann (2001a) also
found that pilots with lower amounts of flying time made more VFR into IMC accidents.
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However, some studies did not show a positive relationship between pilots’
experience and their decision making. Sawyer and Shappell (2009) measured a pilot’s
decision accuracy and eye tracking data to learn the effects of experience and training on
a pilot’s ability to identify adverse weather. Pilot situation assessment was measured in
terms of an estimation of visibility, cloud ceilings, and decision accuracy, and the authors
did not find a significant relationship between pilot experience and situation assessment.
Beringer and Schvaneldt (2002) categorized expert and novice pilots using 1,000
hours of overall flight experience as the criterion, and made them rate the important
weather factors along phases of flight. Although there were no significant differences
between their weather ratings, expert pilots tended to rate the majority of weather factors
as more important than did the novice pilots.

Motivation
In general, motivation is related to behavior changes and the factors that direct the
changes (Cantor et al., 1986). In aviation, the motivational approach asserts that a pilot
continues the VFR flight into IMC because of misplaced motivation (Wiggins & O’Hare,
2003b), such as social pressure or Get-home-itis. Thus, social pressure and time pressure
can be included in the motivation category in Table 1.2.
Social pressure has been shown to affect a pilot’s decision making (Goh &
Wiegmann, 2001b). In their retrospective study, Goh and Wiegmann (2002a) found that
around 55% of VFR into IMC GA accidents had passengers whereas the other 45% of
GA accidents did not. Although the exact effect of passenger presence on a GA pilot’s
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decision making is not clear, it is assumed that pilots may feel pressure to continue VFR
flight into IMC so as not to disappoint the passengers aboard.
The effect of time pressure on decision making is well known, too (Adams et al.,
2002; Beard & Given, 2005; Craig, 1998). Under severe time pressure, people tended to
accelerate their processing (e.g., less time was spent per item of information acquired),
selectively focus on a subset of the more important information, and change their patterns
of processing in the direction of relatively more attribute-based processing. This general
pattern of results is consistent with the simulator results, which suggested that an efficient
strategy under severe time pressure would involve selective and attribute-based
processing (Wickens et al., 1993).
It is also possible that pilots are motivated to fly into adverse weather by seeing
other pilots’ successes in taking off in adverse weather conditions. Beard and Geven
(2005) termed this behavior as frequency gambling, and suggested it is one of a pilot’s
frequent risky behaviors, to takeoff in adverse weather conditions. Frequency gambling
refers to one’s expectant attitude of success in a risky situation.

Personality
One’s personality is relatively stable over time and consistent across situations
(Chidester et al., 1991), and this could affect a pilot’s decision making (Loewenstein et
al., 2001). McGrath (1964) suggested that individual factors such as skill, knowledge,
and personality could affect group performance. Additionally, Helmreich (1986) explored
the structure of men’s and women’s personality and found that personality is a valid
performance determinant in a variety of environments.
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Thus, personality has been regarded to affect pilots’ behavior, although the
concept of accident proneness as a personality type has not been accepted widely (Hunter,
2005; McKenna, 1988). However, together with motivation, personality is difficult to
measure objectively. Knecht et al. (2005) measured the effects of visibility, cloud ceiling,
incentive, and personality on a pilot’s willingness to takeoff in adverse weather. However,
the findings showed that personality could not predict whether a pilot would fly into
adverse weather or not.
To assess how personality affects pilots’ risk-taking behavior, Holt et al. (1991)
developed a new Hazard Attitude Scale (New-HAS), and Hunter (1995) developed the
Aviation Safety Attitude Scale (ASAS). Hunter (2005) also compared several kinds of
hazardous assessment tools (e.g., the ASAS, the Old Hazardous Attitude Scale [OldHAS], the New Hazardous Attitude Scale [New-HAS], the Situational Judgment Test
[SJT], the Thrill and Adventure Seeking Scale, the Locus of Control [LOC], the Risk
Perception and Tolerance, and the Hazardous Event Scale [HES]), and found that the
Likert-scale assessment tools (New-HAS) showed superiority to the previous ipsative
scale (Old-HAS).

Flight Planning
Previous aviation accident analysis studies revealed that a lack of pre-flight
procedures have been related to the VFR into IMC GA accidents (Sawyer & Shappell,
2009; Wiegmann et al., 2008). Knecht (2008a) conducted interviews with 221 GA pilots
across five states in the United States, and investigated the pilots’ weather information
usage patterns. The author measured the time that participants spent in pre-flight planning,
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and found that many GA pilots preferred convenient, simple, and comprehensive forms
of weather information (e.g., METARS) to understand and acquire needed weather
information in their pre-flight briefing stage.

Weather Information
There have been studies conducted as to how the type and format of weather
information display would affect pilots’ situation assessment, but they did not show how
the displayed information actually reduced pilot’s willingness to continue VFR flight into
IMC.
Latorella and Chamberlain (2001) classified GA pilots into three groups
according to their cross-country flight experience, and presented them with three weather
cues separately: VMC, IMC, and Graphical Weather Information System (GWIS)augmented IMC. They found that participants who were faced with the VMC and GWISaugmented IMC display had better confidence ratings, perceived performance, and
information sufficiency than those who were faced with the IMC display. This study
emphasized the benefits of the graphical weather information display to improve pilots’
situation awareness.
Bustamante et al. (2005) examined the relationship between pilots’ SA and trust
in weather systems when they fly in adverse weather. The authors showed participants
static images of the onboard weather radar and static images of NEXRAD. As expected,
participants’ trust significantly increased when the weather information in the two
sources coincided.
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Bliss et al. (2005)’s study showed similar results. The authors conducted a
simulated study with 24 pilots to examine how weather display agreements affect a flight
crew’s weather deviation decision accuracy. These authors combined a captain and a first
officer as one team, and showed them the onboard weather display and NEXRAD. Using
a questionnaire, the authors measured the team’s deviation accuracy, deviation
confidence, and overall decision confidence. The results showed that a team’s confidence
level and deviation decisions were highest when both weather display systems were in
agreement, which indicated the importance of flight display redundancy (Selcon et al.,
1995) and agreement.
Bailey, III, et al. (2007) conducted an empirical study to assess pilots’ decision
confidence as a function of distance, display agreement, communication, leadership, and
experience. Participants were presented with a real-time on-board weather system and a
delayed NEXRAD weather system. The results showed that pilots’ decision confidence
was high when there were display agreements between the weather display systems. Also,
pilots tended to commit sunk cost bias when the outcome was uncertain or the weather
update was not outstanding.
Thus, the weather information display might be better to provide real-time
weather information in an integrated and redundant way if there are additional weather
displays to support the pilot’s decision. Also, providing an auditory display when the
weather severity reaches a certain level might be a good way to prevent VFR only
qualified pilots from continuing flying in IMC. Finally, the weather information might be
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better displayed in a simple and comprehensive form to reduce pilot workload, because
pilots may make decisions in an uncertain and time-constrained flying environment.

Causal Hypotheses
Situation Assessment
Together with pilots’ situation awareness (SA) studies, studies have been
conducted regarding pilots’ situation assessment (Fracker, 1988; Gaba et al., 1995;
Wiegmann et al., 2002) and weather assessment (Coyne et al., 2008; Wiggins et al.,
1995). Although SA and situation assessment concepts are different, those concepts often
have been used interchangeably. Whereas SA refers to an operator’s understanding of a
situation as a whole, which forms a basis for decision making (Endsley, 1995), situation
assessment is referred to as problem recognition in the cognitive process model (Gaba et
al., 1995; Patterson, 2009), and emphasizes the operator’s understanding of a current state.
According to the situation assessment hypothesis, pilots fly into adverse weather
because they do not know they are doing so, or fail to recognize the severity of the
weather (Coyne et al., 2008; Goh & Wiegmann, 2002a; Pauley et al., 2008). The situation
assessment hypothesis also proposes experience as a key factor in diagnosing adverse
weather. This is in accordance with Klein’s (1995) RPD model, which asserts that
experienced decision makers can find and identify good options better than those lessexperienced decision makers when under time pressure and ambiguous conditions
(Burian et al., 2000). Previous weather-related pilot decision error studies were successful
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in correlating pilot experience with the NDM model or the RPD model (Bailey et al.,
2007).
Wiggins et al. (1995) examined the relationship between pilot self-assessment and
performance. They divided forty one participants into three groups according to their
total cross-country flight hours (Table 2.2), and used a self-assessment questionnaire to
measure pilots’ skill, judgment rating, and willingness to take risks. The findings
indicated that the inexperienced pilots were influenced by a combination of both their
self-perceived ability and their risk taking behavior. Goh and Wiegmann (2002a)
analyzed accident data from between 1990 and 1997, and found that there is a significant
relationship between the type of aviation accidents and pilot certifications. About 70% of
pilots who committed VFR-IMC accidents had only a private license, whereas 42% of
pilots who were involved in other GA accidents had commercial certifications. However,
not all studies showed a positive relationship between pilot experience and situation
assessment.
Unlike the previous accident analysis study (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002a),
Wiegmann et al.’s (2002) empirical study did not find a positive relationship between
pilots’ experience and their situation assessments (estimates of visibility and cloud
ceilings) for the short-flying group, and negative correlations were found between the
pilots’ experience and the time and distance that the pilots flew into adverse weather for
the long-flying group. The authors examined the relationship between pilots’ situation
assessment and flight experience, and studied how the location at which a pilot
encounters adverse weather could affect the pilot’s decision to continue the VFR flight
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into IMC. The results showed that there was no significant relationship between the
pilot’s situation assessment (estimation of visibility and cloud ceiling) and flight
experience for the short-flying group, but negative correlations were found for the longflying group. Thus, the exact role that experience plays in a pilot’s decision to continue or
divert the flight was not revealed. Instead, they found that the location at which a pilot
encountered adverse weather could affect the pilot’s decision to continue the flight or not.
Coyne et al.’s (2008) study showed similar results. The authors investigated a
pilot’s ability to estimate the ceiling and visibility in a VFR flight into IMC. The results
showed that instrument-rated pilots did not estimate the ceiling and visibility better than
non-instrument-rated pilots. On the contrary, non-instrument-rated pilots outperformed
instrument-rated pilots in estimating the visibility, and there were no significant
differences between the two groups in estimating the ceiling. Although these authors tried
to adopt the situation assessment hypothesis, they failed to examine the hypothesis.
While the same situation assessment hypothesis was considered, it can be seen
that the results from accident analysis studies and empirical studies were different. Part of
this result might be that the concept of situation assessment was not defined clearly in the
previous studies. Situation assessment is knowing the current situation, and does not
include a prediction of the future situation. In adverse weather conditions, pilots’
situation assessments may include weather assessments and risk assessments.
Orasanu and Fischer (1997) measured GA pilots’ situation assessment in a similar
manner. The authors measured a commercial pilot’s three major decisions while he was
conducting a missed approach due to bad weather. The three decisions were: a go-no go
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decision, the selection of an alternate airport, and a coordination of the flap and gear
extension procedures due to hydraulic failure during the final approach.
The best way to increase situation assessment or situation awareness is training
(Gaba et al., 1995), and the salient cue is related to high level of SA (Endsley, 1999).
Thus, Wiggins and O’Hare (2003b) developed the cue-based training program,
WeatherWise, to enhance pilots’ weather-decision making. The validity of the program
proved helpful in timely decision making to divert when pilots were confronted with
adverse weather.

Risk Assessment
Pilots may correctly assess the weather conditions, but incorrectly determine the
potential risks associated with the weather conditions. Risk assessment is defined as a
structured process to estimate the likelihood and severity of all risks (Coleman & Marks,
1999; Latorella & Prabhu, 2000), and poor risk assessment is a leading factor that causes
poor decision making (Hunter, 2002b; Molesworth et al., 2006). In the aviation domain,
risk assessment means an understanding of the risks associated with flying in adverse
weather conditions. Risk assessment includes the processes of risk perception and risk
tolerance, and can be measured by the Hazardous Event Scale (HES; Hunter, 2002a),
personal weather minimums (Hunter, 1995), and the Aviation Safety Attitude Scale
(ASAS; Hunter, 2002a; Pauley et al., 2008).
Risk perception involves the ability to detect, perceive, and assess the risk
associated with a situation or a traffic hazard (Hunter, 2002b), and can be influenced by
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personal experience and ability (Goh and Wiegmann, 2001b). Risk perception can be
measured by the number of incidents and hazardous events a pilot reports using the HES.
Risk tolerance relates to the amount of risk an individual is willing to accept in a
situation (Hunter, 2002b), and can be measured using personal minimums and attitudes
toward flying (Hunter, 1995). Other factors that area associated with risk assessment are
overconfidence and violation. Violation is a willful disregard of established rules, and can
increase the probability or error and the likelihood that the error results in a negative error
(Reason et al., 1998). Pilots occasionally violate flight rules because they are
overconfident and think they have less of a chance of encountering bad weather, and they
do not fully assess the associated risks when continuing VFR flights into IMC. Goh and
Wiegmann (2002a) examined the causes of GA accidents associated with VFR flights
into IMC using the NTSB statistic data, and found that around 76% of the VFR flights
into IMC accidents were involved with the pilot’s intentional flight into adverse weather.
O’Hare (1990) conducted a questionnaire study with 44 licensed pilots using
Aeronautical Risk Judgment Questionnaire (ARJQ), and found that young and currentlyactive GA pilots were most likely to take the marginal VFR flight. He also found that
they showed a low level of risk awareness as well as high optimistic self-appraisals of
their abilities and judgment (Hunter, 2002b; Goh & Wiegmann, 2001b). Similarly,
Hunter (2006) measured 630 GA pilots’ risk perceptions using a response scale of one
(low risk) to 100 (high risk), and found that participants who rated higher self-confidence
and risky behavior tended to assess their situations as less risky.
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Wiggins et al. (1995) examined the relationship between three levels of
experience (inexperienced, intermediate, and experienced pilots) and pilot self-perceived
risk-taking behavior, pilot judgment, and aeronautical ability. Participants rated their own
skills and judgment in comparison to other pilots of similar experience. Although the
authors failed to find main effects across the three factors, they found significant
interaction effects from inexperienced pilots between self-perceived abilities and their
risk-taking behaviors. The results also indicated that inexperienced pilots are more likely
to be influenced by their risk-taking behaviors than their abilities.

Decision Framing
Minsky (1975, p.246) defined a frame as, a ―collection of questions for
representing a stereotyped situation.‖ and asserted that there are some kinds of
information related to each frame. He explained that some information is related to how
to use the frame, while other information is about what one can expect to happen next,
and still other information is related to what to do if expectations are not confirmed.
In summary, pilots’ decision making depends on how the problem is represented,
and what frame is used to interpret the situation (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002a). For example,
if pilots frame their decisions in terms of gains in a continued VFR flight into IMC, they
are prone to continue flying to the adverse weather. Similarly, when pilots frame their
decisions in terms of losses or put priority in safety, they are more likely to divert early in
an adverse weather condition. Prospective theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), one of
the risky decision making models, also asserts that a person chooses either a risky or safe
action depending on how he/she frames an option (as a gain or loss), and also on ―the
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norms, habits, and personal characteristics of the decision maker‖ (p. 341). A well-known
decision framing bias is sunk cost bias /effect (Arkes & Hutzel, 2000).

Sunk Cost Effect
Sunk cost explains that pilots who have flown further are motivated to continue
flying to the destination, despite adverse weather conditions, because they might have
spent more time and money to get there. Batt and O’Hare (2005) examined 491 weatherrelated GA occurrences from data drawn from the Australian aviation accidents and
incidents of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), and divided occurrences
into VFR into IMC, precautionary landing, and weather avoidance groups. The authors
found that the VFR into IMC occurrences group showed an increasing tendency to
continue flying as they flew closer to the destination. This result was in contrast with the
weather avoidance group, whose portion of weather-related GA occurrences was highest
in the early flight.

Decision Confidence
Good situation assessment is important to make good decisions. However, good
situation assessment itself is not sufficient for making a good decision (Artman, 2000).
Decision confidence plays an important role in the decision-making processes that guide
our everyday activities (Griffin & Tversky, 1992; Lichacz & Farrell, 2005), and is found
to be a valid predictor of recognition (Costermans et al., 1992).
Wiggins and O’Hare (2003a) showed 577 pilots 10 randomly-selected weather
pictures taken in the air, and then asked them to choose whether they would continue the
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VFR flight or not. Pilots accessed the questionnaire through the Internet, and expert pilots
showed higher confidence levels than novice pilots.
However, Goh and Wiegmann (2002b) found different results. Using preexperimental questionnaires, the authors asked pilots to rate how good they were at
monitoring, recognizing, diagnosing, generating, and implementing solutions when
compared with average GA pilots. The results showed that experienced pilots rated
themselves better at recognizing problems and implementing solutions than average GA
pilots, but they did not feel more confident in diagnosing the underlying causes of the
problems. Experienced pilots also were conservative in their self-perceptions of their
diagnostic skills, which suggest that confidence in diagnosing situations does not
necessarily come with more flight experience, and should be enhanced within flight
training curricula.
O’Hare (1989)’s study showed similar results. The author recruited 18 licensed
pilots and asked them to conduct a cross-country flight task while referring to weather
information. Participants rated their risk-taking behaviors, skill, and judgment after the
experiment. The author found that the more confident pilots were willing to accept higher
risk levels than the less confident pilots.

Pilot Decision Making Training
Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) Training
Telfer (1986) conducted an empirical study with 20 student pilots using the
Australian Pilot Judgment Training (PJT) materials. He divided participants into three
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groups: experimental (trained with manual and special instruction), academic (trained
with manual), and control groups (no training). Participants conducted pre and postwritten tests of manuals, followed by a flight simulation test. The written test results
showed that there were no significant differences in knowledge among each group.
However, in the flight simulation test, the experimental and academic groups
outperformed the control group in overcoming hazards and interferences. Overall, the use
of the Australian PJT materials from the beginning of the flight training was regarded as
essential for pilot judgment training. Nevertheless, there are some limitations in
Australian PJT study (Telfer, 1989). First, there was a delay in completing the material
between each group. Because participants were not divided into each group randomly,
participants’ motivation to finish the materials was different in each group. Such
differences in motivation caused a performance difference among groups. Second, the
validity of the PJT program was not examined, because no construction testing had been
done to examine the effectiveness of this training program.
Adams and Thompson (1987) asserted that judgment errors are the major causal
factors of aircraft mishaps, and developed an ADM manual to improve helicopter pilots’
decision making. The authors found that pilots who received ADM training showed
better performance than control groups. However, the ADM manual had never been
tested for its effectiveness on reducing pilots’ decision errors. Jensen et al. (1987) found
that instrument pilots who receiving aeronautical decision making training showed
reduced pilot error rates.
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WeatherWise
Previous aviation accident analysis studies revealed that weather comprised the
highest portion of fatalities in GA accidents (AOPA, 2008), and continued VFR flight
into IMC was the main cause of fatalities among weather-related GA accidents (Batt &
O’Hare, 2005; Wiggins, 1999). Currently, the FAA has 17 documents that cover weatherrelated topics, but VFR into IMC is dealt with in only a few of these documents
(Wiegmann et al., 2008). Thus, there has been an increasing need to develop a GA pilot
weather decision-making training program to reduce weather-related accidents.
Various stressors (i.e., time pressure, noise, ambiguity, etc.) during the flight can
narrow a pilot’s attention field by systematically reducing the cue utilization range (Hiel
& Mervielde, 2007). Thus, recognizing a weather cue appropriately is vital in order for a
pilot to make a correct decision. For this purpose, Drs. Hunter, Wiggins, and O’Hare
(2000) developed WeatherWise, a computer-based training program, to improve pilot
weather cue recognition skills. WeatherWise was produced by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and the Office of Aerospace Medicine for the Aviation Safety
Program of the Flight Standards Service with the assistance of the Ohio State University,
the University of Western Sydney, the University of Otago, and King Schools (Sawyer,
2009). WeatherWise was approved by the FAA for free public use. As WeatherWise was
produced and distributed in the form of a CD, pilots can acquire weather cue recognition
skills without the help of an instructor. WeatherWise is easy to install and does not
require a flight simulator to use.
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WeatherWise is composed of three parts: the WEATHER TO FLY, the DECIDE
TO FLY, and the TAKE A FLIGHT. In the WEATHER TO FLY section, a user is asked
to rate the given weather condition as either above or below the minimum requirements
for VFR flight. This test is to alert a user as to how he/she is not clearly aware of the
differences between VFR and IFR conditions. At the end of the section, the program
shows the score for the total correct answers, but does not show which answers were
correct. Then, WeatherWise provides a list of weather cues, such as cloud base, visibility,
cloud coloring, cloud density, terrain clearance, rain showers, and cloud type, and briefly
explains how each cue can be recognized in a given image. After that, the program asks a
user to find weather cues that are present in the image. Once answers are submitted, the
program provides feedback as to the actual features present and the correct decision to
make.
The DECIDE TO FLY is composed of accident investigation, diverting during
flight, and a summary. The program asks a user to identify factors that might lead to the
aircraft’s accident in the scenario. Then, WeatherWise asks a user to choose one
alternative airport to divert to among three alternative airports, and asks why the user
chose that airport. It aims to tell a user how difficult it is for a pilot to make a weatherrelated decision during flight. Once the answers are submitted, the program provides
feedback about the correct alternative airport and reasons for that selection.
Finally, in the TAKE A FLIGHT section, a user completes a flight with the given
flight scenario by seeing short video clips simulating a series of flights from a departing
airport to the destination airport in Australia. The weather was VFR on departure, and a
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user is expected a smooth flight. Among the five flight stages, a user is asked to choose
one stage in which to divert, and one alternative airport (Figure 2.9). Once a decision to
divert has been made, the user will land at the alternative airport, and feedback about
divert decision to divert is provided. At the end of the program, WeatherWise provides
the total points for decision timing out of 100, and for the decision option of the
alternative airport out of 100. Thus, a user can learn his score after the training. The GA
pilots are required to score at least 80 out of 100 in each category, and it takes around 20
minutes to finish the training program.

Figure 2.9 Screenshot of WeatherWise

Wiggins and O’Hare (2003b) examined the validity of the WeatherWise program
through self-report assessments and performance assessments. These authors categorized
the decision points into five stages, and asked participants to fly VFR into IMC and divert
at the optimal decision point. The participants were composed of 66 licensed pilots who
had accumulated less than 150 hours of cross-country flight experience. The result
showed that those who were trained with the WeatherWise training program recognized
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more weather cues, and tended to use those weather cues during flight. They also showed
better performance in finding the divert stage than the control group. The results
indicated that the WeatherWise can be helpful for novice pilots to build up weather cue
recognition skills. However, there was no significant increase of an expert pilot’s flight
performance, which indicated that WeatherWise may not be so helpful for the expert pilot.

Computer-Aided Weather Test (CAWT)
The CAWT is a computer-aided weather testing software developed from a
process model (Rockwell & Giffin, 1987). It is composed of four elements: the pilot’s
biographical questionnaire, a simulated flight involving weather information acquisition
and decision making, a computer-aided debriefing, and a computer-presented quiz about
pilot knowledge and judgment of weather (Giffin & Rockwell, 1984). Quiz questions
were generated from publications such as How to Obtain a Good Weather Briefing
(FAA-P-87840-30A), Aviation Weather (FAA and NWS AC-00-6), and Weather Flying
(Buck, 1970).
Giffin and Rockwell (1987) conducted an empirical study with 454 pilots about
the value of computer aided testing, CAWT, and found that pilots who had fewer crosscountry hours, fewer IFR ratings, fewer average number of weather inquiries, and lower
quiz scores had poor weather information-seeking strategies. The authors suggested the
use of different weather scenarios to examine the validity of the software, and the
development of a training module to improve the pilot’s weather information search and
decision behavior.
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Human Competency Model
Many factors have been suggested as causes of weather-related GA accidents in
Table 1.2. Among them, knowledge, skills, and attitudes are components of human
competencies and have been known to be important components in training (Salas et al.,
2000). However, a focus on some factors does not necessarily affect pilots’ overall
decision making. Previous studies showed that knowledge and skills do not necessarily
change people’s behavior (Feuerstein et al., 2004). McClellend (1971) asserted that
knowledge and skills generally are easy to train because they are located in the outer
layer of the human competence model. Inner competence factors, such as personality
traits, attitude, and motivation are hard to train, because they are hard to measure and are
affected easily by specific situations and environments (Figure 2.10). However, they also
have been known to be the causal factors of weather-related GA accidents (Table 1.2).
The WeatherWise program focused on developing weather knowledge and the
weather cue-recognition skills of pilots to improve their weather decision-making
abilities, but do not consider overall human competence factors that affect performance.
Cantor et al. (1986) asserted the effect of motivation, and suggested that motivation
cannot be fully understood without considering the self-concept: people’s understanding
on themselves. Thus, future weather decision-making training programs might do better
to consider all human competence factors to maximize their training effects.
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Figure 2.10 Structure of Human Competence Model (Kim, 2002)

Flight Simulator
Benefits of Simulation Studies
Human factors engineers analyze and interact with people, the work environment,
and technology systems. Simulation is a commonly deployed method for the study and
analysis of human behavior (Drury, 2005; Laughery, 2005) in complex environments
such as aviation (Dahlstrom et al., 2009; Sarter et al., 2007), driving (Lee et al., 2007),
and healthcare (Gardiner et al., 1998; Thompson et al., 2004), to name a few. Simulations
allow all participants to experience the same set of controlled tasks and conditions, and
make it possible to collect performance data in simulated environments that may be occur
only rarely in the real world. Thus, a flight simulator has been used to train pilots and to
measure their performance and workloads because it can provide high degrees of realism
in the environment with no more than minimal risk (Bradley & Abelson, 1995).

67

However, simulation studies have their limitations as well. For example, a desk
top flight simulator provides sufficient visual cues, but auditory cues and motion cues are
not sufficient to influence the vestibular system. Additionally, delayed visual feedback
and a lack of aerodynamic force transmission lower the reality of flying compared to an
in-cockpit study. Simulation fidelity also may influence pilots’ decision-making training,
although previous studies asserted that there are no significant differences between using
a high-fidelity simulation and a low-fidelity simulation. Nevertheless, there are more
strengths than limitations in simulations, and many studies have been conducted using a
simulator.

Applications of Flight Simulator to Assess Pilot Behavior
Flight simulator has been used for pilot training because it can provide high
degrees of realism in the environment (Bradley & Abelson, 1995) as well as experimental
control (Chidester et al., 1991).
Molesworth et al. (2006) suggested that interactions with hazards during
simulated flight training could increase pilots’ situation assessments and eventually
develop decision making. In either immersive high-fidelity simulations or lower-fidelity
simulations, flight simulators provide methodological benefits for research and training.
Dahlstrom and Nahlinder (2009) investigated the mental workloads of civil
aviation pilots using physiological measures, including heart rates and eye movements,
and subjective measures. The results showed that there were no significant differences in
heart rates and mental workloads between the simulator flights and aircraft flights. This
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would hold true in this study, as the type of aircraft used will be GA. The motion cues,
which were regarded as critical factors in military aircrafts, almost can be overcome by
providing frequent visuals of moving environments (Bradley & Abelson, 1995).
However, in weather decision-making training, the fidelity of simulation is not
negligible, in that pilots clearly should recognize weather cues such as the visibility,
ceiling, and cloud movement upon seeing the display. If the displayed weather
information does not provide a moderate level of fidelity, a pilot may have difficulty in
correctly assessing the weather and making a decision in a gradually aggravating weather
conditions.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODS

Participants
A total of 40 GA pilots participated in this study. They were recruited from local
flight club, flight schools, and airports in Upstate South Carolina throughout
advertisement (Appendix A). They were divided randomly into one of two groups of 20:
a WeatherWise training group, and a control group. The control group received fatigue
training as a non-weather-related training. Table 3.1 provides the details of 40
participants’ demographic and flight experience information.

Table 3.1 Participants’ Demographic and Flight Experience Information

Age

Total flight
hours

Last 90 days
flight hours

Total cross
country flight
hours

Last 90 days
cross country
flight hours

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

WeatherWise
group

41.8

14.9

1708.5

3144.2

27.7

31.8

866.5

2191.9

13.8

15.6

Control
group

45.7

17.0

2537.2

3260.6

20.3

26.8

1474.8

2789.2

12.4

19.8

Total

43.8

15.9

2122.9

3189.3

24.0

29.3

1170.7

2495.1

13.1

17.6

Thirty eight pilots were male, and two were female pilots. Twenty six pilots got
married, and 14 were single. Pilots’ ages ranged from 20 to 78 years, with an average of
17 years of flight experience. Pilots’ total flight time ranged from 53 to 13,000 hours
(Mean: 2123, SD: 3189). Thirty of them were IFR-qualified, and 10 were VFR-only
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qualified pilots. Pilots were classified to either experienced or inexperienced pilots based
on their total cross-country flight hours (Table 2.2; cut-off 500 hours), and 15 were
experienced pilots and 25 were inexperienced pilots. On average, the control group was
slightly older and had slightly less recent flight experience than the WeatherWise training
group although the mean of the control group’s total flight hours and total cross-country
flight hours were higher than the WeatherWise training group (Table 3.1). There were no
significant differences in age (F (1, 38) = 0.58, p = 0.45), and flight experiences (F (1, 38)
= 1.19, p = 0.29) between the two groups.

Apparatus
All experimental data were collected in the Human Factors Laboratory on the
Clemson University campus (Figure 3.1). A desktop computer with a flat-panel display
and a projector were used to run the experiment. The desktop computer is a Dell OptiPlex
745, with a 2.4 GHz Intel dual-core processor and 3,072 MB RAM. The addition of extra
RAM and an updated video card, the GeForce 8500, were added to support the highresolution settings used in the X-Plane 9 flight simulation program developed by Laminar
Research Inc. A 17‖ Dell monitor was used to view the instrument panel. A Panasonic
PT-FW300 projector was used to project a large image of the cockpit view in front of the
pilot, and the size of the projected image will be 98.5" * 62", with a resolution of
1,280*2,048 pixels.
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Figure 3.1 Human Factors Laboratory Flight Simulator

The X-Plane program has add-ons that can be adapted for either home use for the
PC-gamer, or as a high-tech training tool for pilot certification. In this study, the home
version was used, with the addition of a yoke equipped with a throttle, mixture controls,
and rudder pedals to interact with the flight simulation program. The X-Plane has
advanced capabilities to design and manipulate flight scenarios, and used widely
throughout flight simulation studies. The program allowed for the collection of flight
parameters (e.g., altitude, time traveled, distance traveled, airspeed, etc.), and
programmed weather conditions were plugged in to ensure that the weather specifications
of the scenario could be enacted as designed.
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The specifications used in the weather scenario in this study (Table 3.2) were
created with the assistance of meteorologists, and the weather was gradually aggravated
as participant approaches to the destination airport (KLKU).
WeatherWise, the CD-ROM weather-training product sponsored by the FAA, was
used as the weather-training program, and Garmin GPS (GNS 430) was installed to the
flight simulator to help pilots navigate to the destination airport.

Table 3.2 Airport and Weather Information
Airport
ID

Wind

Visibility

Ceiling

Weather
Category

Distance

ETA

KCKB

180/10 KT

10 SM

SCT 10.0 M’

VFR

----

----

KEKN

180/20 KT

6 SM

SCT 8.0 M’

VFR

31 NM

:17

W99

180/20 KT

5 SM

BKN 6.0 M’

MVFR

54 NM

:30

KVBW

180/20 KT

4 SM

BKN 5.0 M’

MVFR

82 NM

:45

KCHO

180/20 KT

2 SM

BKN 4.0 M’

IFR

109 NM

1:00

KLKU

180/15 KT

1 SM

BKN 3.0 M’
OVC 1.0 M’

LIFR

132 NM

1:12

Hypotheses
Although Wiggins and O’Hare (2003b) and Saywer and Shappell (2009)
investigated the effects of weather training on pilots’ decision making, their studies were
not conducted using flight simulators, nor were there any significant differences in
decision accuracy between expert and novice pilots. However, according to the situation
assessment hypothesis, expert pilots showed higher situation assessment abilities than
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novice pilots, and training was regarded as the best method to increase their situation
assessments. Thus, it is expected that the WeatherWise training would improve pilots’
situation assessments (i.e., weather assessments, risk assessments), and eventually their
tactical decision making (i.e., decision accuracy, decision confidence) in gradually
aggravating weather conditions. To meet the purposes, the following hypotheses were
tested by this study:

Hypothesis 1: The WeatherWise training group will estimate the visibility better than the
control group.
Hypothesis 2: The WeatherWise training group will estimate the ceiling better than the
control group.
Hypothesis 3: The WeatherWise training group will estimate the weather condition better
than the control group.
Hypothesis 4: The WeatherWise training group will assess risks better than the control
group.
Hypothesis 5: The WeatherWise training group will be more confident in their decisions
to divert than the control group.
Hypothesis 6: The WeatherWise training group will divert at or before the IMC more
often than the control group.
Hypothesis 7: There will be a positive relationship between pilots’ situation assessments
and tactical decision making.
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Experimental Design
This study used a single factor between-subjects design. The independent
variables were two levels of weather decision-making training (i.e., the WeatherWise
training and the fatigue training). The dependent variables were pilot’s situation
assessment and tactical decision making. Pilot situation assessments were composed of
weather assessment and risk assessment, and were measured using the post-experiment
questionnaire. The post-experiment questionnaire was designed by modifying previous
studies (Hunter, 1995; Knecht, 2008b; Shappell et al., 2010) to increase study validity.
Weather assessment questions were composed of participants’ estimations of the
visibility, ceiling, and weather condition (e.g., VFR, MVFR, IFR, and LIFR). Weather
assessment was measured by calculating the visibility proportional error (VPE; Coyne et
al., 2008), ceiling proportional error (CPE; Coyne et al., 2008), and weather condition
estimation frequency. The CPE was computed as [(Estimated ceiling-Actual
ceiling)/Actual ceiling]. Similarly, the VPE was computed as [(Estimated visibilityActual visibility)/Actual visibility]. Negative values of CPE and VPE indicate that a
ceiling estimation is below the actual depicted ceiling, and visibility estimation is below
the actual depicted visibility. The CPE and VPE data were analyzed using a single factor
analysis of variance (ANOVA).
Risk assessment was conducted in terms of risk perception and risk tolerance
using the Hazardous Event Scale (HES; Hunter, 1995), personal minimums, and the
Aviation Safety Attitude Scale (ASAS; Hunter, 1995). The validity of these
questionnaires was examined by Hunter in 2006. Risk assessment questions are
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composed of previous hazard accidents or events, personal weather minimums for VFR
local and cross-country flights, and pilots’ attitudes toward flying.
Using the flight simulation program and post-experiment questionnaire, tactical
decision making was evaluated in terms of decision accuracy and decision confidence.
Decision accuracy was evaluated by measuring the proximity from an actual divert point
to an optimal divert point. Decision confidence question represented participants’
confidence levels in making divert decision, and was measured by the subjective rating
method by asking participants assess themselves on a scale ranging from zero (not at all
confident) to 100 (extremely confident). Subjective rating scales have been frequently
used to measure participants’ workload or decision making because they are easy to
administer, and have high face validity (Bustamante et al., 2005; Weirwille & Eggemeier,
1993).

Procedures
Participants were briefed on the study upon arrival in the laboratory. They were
told that the purpose of the study was to understand GA pilot behavior during crosscountry flight. They signed a consent form (Appendix B), and filled out a background
questionnaire (Appendix C). The questionnaire included demographic information and
flight experience such as total flight time, recent three month flight time, cross-country
flight time, certificate, license, etc. Then, participants were divided randomly into two
groups: the WeatherWise training group and the control group. The WeatherWise
training group went through the WeatherWise program using the desktop computer in the
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lab. The control group did not receive any weather-related training, but watched an
aviation-related video file from the Internet (Physiology of Flight: fatigue in aviation,
2010) using the desktop computer in the lab. In both groups, the training session lasted
approximately 20 minutes.
Prior to the real experiment, participants flew a short practice flight to familiarize
themselves with the flight controls and dynamics of the simulator, and the cockpit
displays they would use during the cross-country flight. There was no time limitation in
practice flight.
Participants were provided with a weather briefing (Appendix D), sectional chart,
the Cessna 172 owner’s manual, the Cessna flight computer, a navigation log, and the
relevant weather information (Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts (TAFs), METARS, and
Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs)).
Then, participants were given instruction about the detail flight procedures. They
were told that the aircraft (Cessna 172) was not certified for instrument flight, and they
were the pilot in command and had to be aware of possible aircraft mechanical failures,
weather changes, rising terrains, and other aircraft throughout the flight. When
participants were ready to fly, they flew a simulated VFR solo cross-country flight from
the North Central West Virginia Airport (KCKB) to the Louisa County/ Freeman Field
Airport (KLKU), as long as they deemed they did not violate the VFR in a gradually
deteriorating weather condition.
The flight path distance was around 132 nautical miles, and consisted of a route
with six points along it (KCKB, KEKN, W99, KVBW, KCHO, and KLKU) where
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weather deteriorated. This deterioration included decreased visibility, cloud ceiling, and a
terrain that crossed over several points of higher elevation (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2 Screenshot of Simulated Cross-Country Flight
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As shown in Figure 3.3, the rising terrain occurred early into the flight (around
30NM), and continued until marginal conditions encountered.

Figure 3.3 Sectional Chart of Flight Path (fltplan.com)

The visibility and cloud ceiling specifications of six points along the flight path
can be found in Table 3.2, which details the progression from visually clear to instrument
conditions. The weather conditions around the departing airport, KCKB, indicated high
visibility and cloud ceiling, in contrast to the area around the destination airport, KLKU,
which exhibited severely deteriorated visibility and a lowered cloud ceiling.
The cross-country flight is either an IFR or VFR flight, for which the distance to
the nearest airport is more than 20 nautical miles (Wiggins et al., 1995). Participants were
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allowed to maintain a cruise speed of 110 knots indicated air speed (KIAS) and altitude
range between 6,000’ mean sea level (MSL) and 8,000’ MSL. It took approximately
twenty minutes to get in MVMC, and forty minutes to get in IMC, and this period
allowed for ample time for the pilot to become accustomed to the aircraft prior to
experiencing any adverse weather.
When participants encountered IMC, they were allowed to make a divert turn to
an alternative airport. The study was terminated immediately when the pilot either began
to divert to an alternative airport, lost control of the aircraft, or crashed on the terrain.
Then, participants went through the post-experiment questionnaire (Appendix F),
received compensation of 50 dollars for their participation, and were debriefed. The
amount of time required for the study was about 90 minutes, and the study results were
saved for later analysis of situation assessment and tactical decision making.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS

To evaluate the effects of weather training on pilots’ situation assessments and
tactical decision making in gradually aggravating weather conditions, the following
hypotheses were tested by this study:

Hypothesis 1: The WeatherWise training group will estimate the visibility better than the
control group.
Hypothesis 2: The WeatherWise training group will estimate the ceiling better than the
control group.
Hypothesis 3: The WeatherWise training group will estimate the weather condition better
than the control group.
Hypothesis 4: The WeatherWise training group will assess risks better than the control
group.
Hypothesis 5: The WeatherWise training group will be more confident in their decisions
to divert than the control group.
Hypothesis 6: The WeatherWise training group will divert at or before the IMC more
often than the control group.
Hypothesis 7: There will be a positive relationship between pilots’ situation assessments
and tactical decision making.
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Situation Assessment
Weather Assessment
Estimation of Visibility
Participants were asked to estimate the visibility when they were confronted with
adverse weather conditions. The visibility is the greatest distance at which an object can
be seen, and is reported as status mile (SM) (ICAO, 2002). The visibility proportional
error (VPE) was computed as [(Estimated visibility - Actual visibility) / Actual visibility]
and analyzed using a single factor ANOVA (Coyne et al., 2008). The results showed that
there were no significant differences in the estimation of visibility between the two
groups, F (1, 38) = 0.79, p = 0.38 (Figure 4.1). Interestingly, the VPEs of 36 participants
out of 40 were negative, which indicated that most participants underestimated the
visibility (visibility was higher than participants estimated).
0

Visibility Proportional Error

Control

WeatherWise

-0.2

-0.4

-0.6

-0.8

-1

Figure 4.1 Main Effect of Training on Visibility Estimation
Note: Negative values of VPE indicate that visibility was higher than participants estimated. Error bars
reflect the standard error of the mean.
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Estimation of Ceiling
Participants were also asked to estimate the ceiling when they would like to
discontinue the flight. The ceiling is the lowest layer of clouds and is reported as above
ground level (AGL). Similarly, the ceiling proportional error (CPE) was computed as
[(Estimated ceiling - Actual ceiling) / Actual ceiling] and analyzed using a single factor
ANOVA (Coyne et al., 2008). Actual ceiling was computed as [programmed ceiling
height – terrain height] to calculate in AGL. Unlike the negative values of the VPE, the
CPE of 32 participants out of 40 was positive, which indicated that most participants
overestimated the ceiling (ceiling was lower than participants estimated). In addition, the
WeatherWise training group showed better ceiling estimation accuracy than the control
group, and there were significant effects of training on the estimation of ceiling between
the two groups, F (1, 38) = 4.65, p = 0.03 (Figure 4.2).

Ceiling Proportional Error

1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Control

WeatherWise

Figure 4.2 Main Effect of Training on Ceiling Estimation
Note: Positive values of CPE indicate that ceiling was lower than participants estimated. Error bars
reflect the standard error of the mean.
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Estimation of Weather Condition
Finally, participants were asked to estimate the weather conditions (e.g., VFR,
MVFR, IFR, LIFR) when they were confronted with adverse weather conditions. The
Mann-Whitney U test was used as a nonparametric method because participants’ weather
condition estimations were ordinal (rank-ordering) data. The purpose of this test was to
examine whether there were significant differences in the medians of weather condition
estimation between the control group and the WeatherWise training group. The findings
indicated that there were no significant differences in the medians of weather condition
estimation between the two groups (the Mann-Whitney

= 161.5, nonsignificant, see

Appendix G for calculation). Frequency analysis on the weather condition estimation of
the control group and the WeatherWise training group are presented in Figure 4.3.
18

Number of Respondents

16
14
12
10
8

Control

6

WeatherWise

4
2
0
LIFR

IFR

MVFR

VFR

Weather Condition Estimation

Figure 4.3 Frequency Analysis on Weather Condition Estimation
Note: There was no response for LIFR among the WeatherWise training group, and no response for VFR
among the control group.
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The weather assessments of the seven outlier participants in each group (Figure
4.4) were compared to see whether there were distinct differences in the estimation of
visibility, ceiling, and weather conditions due to weather training. The findings again
showed that here were no significant differences in the estimation of visibility (F (1, 12)
= 1.19, p = 0.29) and estimation of weather conditions (the Mann-Whitney

= 10.5,

nonsignificant, see Appendix G for calculation), but there were significant differences in
the estimation of ceiling (F (1, 12) = 9.22, p = 0.01) between the two groups.

Figure 4.4 Outlier Participants’ Divert Points

In summary, the WeatherWise training group and the control group were not
significantly different in the estimation of visibility and weather conditions. However,
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there were significant differences in the estimation of ceiling between the two groups.
Furthermore, the comparison of seven outlier participants in each group clearly showed
that the control group tended to overestimate the ceiling whereas the WeatherWise
training group tended to underestimate the ceiling (Figure 4.5). It can also be seen that
the WeatherWise training group showed higher ceiling estimation accuracy than the
control group.
0.8

Ceiling Proportional Error

0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Control

WeatherWise

-0.2
-0.4

Figure 4.5 Main Effect of Training on Ceiling Estimation of Outlier Participants
Note: Positive values of CPE indicated that ceiling was lower than participants estimated, and negative
values of CPE indicated that ceiling was higher than participants estimated.

Risk Assessment
Risk Perception
Participants’ risk assessment was measured in terms of risk perception and risk
tolerance. Risk perception is the ability to detect, perceive, and assess the risk associated
with a situation or a traffic hazard (Hunter, 2002b), and was measured by the number of
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incidents and hazardous events a pilot reported (Hazardous Event Scale: Hunter, 2002a).
The HES is a ten-item scale, and has a possible range of 0 to 21. Higher scores indicated
that the participants had experienced more hazardous events (Hunter, 2005).
There were no significant differences in the risk perception between the control
group (Mean: 7.65, SD: 4.27) and the WeatherWise training group (Mean: 7.85, SD:
6.60), F (1, 38) = 0.01, p = 0.91). The mean numbers of hazardous events between the
two groups are presented in Figure 4.6.

Numbers of hazardous events
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WeatherWise

Figure 4.6 Mean Numbers of Hazardous Events

Risk Tolerance
Risk tolerance is the amount of risk an individual is willing to accept in a specific
situation (Hunter, 2002b), and was measured using personal minimums and the Aviation
Safety Attitude Scale (ASAS; Hunter, 1995).
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Personal minimums represent participants’ visibility and ceiling minimums, and
the percentage of the common practices under which they would fly. Thus, when the
given scenario ceiling was lower than their ceiling minimum or the visibility was less
than this minimum, participants would not continue flying. The results showed that there
were no significant differences in the weather minimums and common practices between
the two groups (Figures 4.7 to 4.10; see Appendix H for calculation). Table 4.1
summarizes the details of personal minimums of the control group and the WeatherWise
training group.

Table 4.1 Personal Minimums
Personal Minimums
Visibility (SM)

Ceiling (Feet)

Common Practices (%)

7.14

3487.5

74.21

2.23

772.1

23.89

WeatherWise

7.10

3437.5

80.33

training group

2.012

912.3

24.75

Control group

Note: Upper values represent mean, and lower values represent standard deviation.
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Visibility Minimums (Status Miles)

10
8
6
4
2
0
Control

WeatherWise

Figure 4.7 Personal Visibility Minimums

Ceiling Minimums (Feet)
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Figure 4.8 Personal Ceiling Minimums
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Figure 4.9 Percentages of Common Practices in a VFR Local Flight
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Figure 4.10 Percentages of Common Practices in a Cross-Country Local Flight
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ASAS represents pilots’ attitudes about flying and consists of questions regarding
weather, the risks encountered in aviation, the likelihood of experiencing an accident, and
self-perceived skill (Hunter, 2005). The ASAS is a 27-item scale, and response choices
range from 1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicated that the
participants had safer attitudes toward flight.
The findings showed that there were no significant differences in the ASAS
response between the control group (Mean: 2.86, SD: 0.94) and the WeatherWise training
group (Mean: 2.91, SD: 0.94), F (1, 52) = 0.04, p = 0.85 (Figure 4.11).
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Figure 4.11 Mean Responses of Aviation Safety Attitude Scale

Overall, the personal minimum and ASAS analyses showed that there were no
significant differences in the risk tolerance between the control group and the
WeatherWise training group although the WeatherWise training group was more
conservative toward flying into adverse weather conditions than the control group.
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Tactical Decision Making

Decision Accuracy
In this study, four weather conditions were deployed along the flight path, which
passed by six airports (KCKB, KEKN, W99, KVBW, KCHO, and KLKU) (Figure 4.12).
The weather conditions were chosen in order to simulate gradually worsening weather
conditions: VFR (blue circled area), MVFR (red circled area), IFR (green circled area),
and LIFR (purple circled area).

Figure 4.12 Weather Conditions along the Flight Path

Pilot tactical decision making is in-flight judgment and was evaluated in terms of
decision accuracy and decision confidence. Decision accuracy was evaluated by
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measuring the distance that a pilot has flown from an optimal divert point to an actual
divert point, and the distance that a pilot has flown into adverse weather conditions. A
coordinate distance calculator was used to measure the distance. An optimal divert point
was judged by three expert pilots, who chose stage #10 out of 15 screenshots of divert
points along the flight path (Figure 4.13; see Appendix I for 15 screenshots of divert
points along the flight path).

Figure 4.13 Participants’ Divert Points
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In Figure 4.13, green dots represent divert points of the WeatherWise training
group, red dots represent divert points of the control group, and yellow dots represent 15
screenshots of weather conditions along the flight path.
The distances between the optimal divert point and the actual divert point were
not statistically significant, but approached significance, F (1, 38) = 3.43, p = 0.07
(Figure 4.14).
20

Decision Accuracy (NM)
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Figure 4.14 Main Effects of Training on Decision Accuracy
Note: Decision accuracy represents the distance between an optimal divert point and an actual divert point.

When compared in terms of the distances flown into adverse weather, however,
there was significant main effect of training between the WeatherWise training group and
the control group, F (1, 38) = 13.04, p = 0.001. As can be seen from Figure 4.15, the
control group (Mean: 41.32, SD: 15.54) generally diverted later than the WeatherWise
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training group (Mean: 26.62, SD: 9.47) when they encountered adverse weather
conditions.
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Figure 4.15 Main Effects of Training on Distances Flying into Adverse Weather

Decision Confidence
The decision confidence represents participants’ confidence levels in making the
divert decision. It was measured using a subjective rating method by asking participants
assess themselves on a scale ranging from zero (not at all confident) to 100 (extremely
confident).
The findings showed that the confidence level of the control group was higher
than the WeatherWise training group. However, there was no significant difference in
decision confidence between the two groups (Figure 4.16), F (1, 38) = 1.79, p = 0.19.
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Figure 4.16 Main Effects of Training on Decision Confidence

When compared in terms of their flight experience, (Table 2.2; cut-off 500 hours
of cross-country flight), however, the expert group showed significantly higher decision
confidence than the novice group (Figure 4.17), F (1, 38) = 9.13, p = 0.004.
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Figure 4.17 Main Effects of Flight Experience on Decision Confidence
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effects of weather recognition training
on GA pilots’ situation assessment and tactical decision making under gradually
worsening weather conditions. The discussions are composed of pilot situation
assessment, tactical decision making, significance and academic contribution of the study.
The tests for seven hypotheses are also discussed.

Situation Assessment
Pilot situation assessment is a pilot’s understanding of a current flight state and
was evaluated in this study in terms of weather assessment and risk assessment.
Participants’ weather assessment was measured in terms of the estimation of visibility,
ceiling, and weather conditions. One of the hypotheses was that the WeatherWise training
group would estimate the visibility, ceiling, and weather conditions better than the control
group. Tests of the hypotheses showed that the estimation of visibility and weather
conditions of the WeatherWise training group was not better statistically than the control
group; however, there was a significant main effect of training on the ceiling estimation
between the two groups. Overall, there were no statistical differences in the weather
assessment abilities between the WeatherWise training group and the control group.
The results indicated that pilots may have difficulties in estimating weather
conditions correctly, and that they often consider multiple factors when estimating
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weather conditions. This finding is consistent with Knecht et al.’s (2003) results. The
authors investigated the effects of visibility, ceiling, and financial incentives on pilots’
decisions to take off in marginal weather conditions. There were no significant
differences for the separate main effect (i.e., visibility, ceiling, and financial incentive),
but there were significant differences in the interaction effect between visibility and
ceiling, which implied that pilots might make weather-related decisions based on the
simultaneous consideration of multiple factors. Similarly, Coyne et al. (2008)
investigated pilots’ ability to estimate the visibility and ceiling in a VFR into IMC
scenario. They found that pilots tended to overestimate the ceiling, and this trend
increased as visibility increased. The authors asserted that an interaction effect of
visibility and ceiling might impact a pilot’s weather condition estimation.
The weather assessment findings in this study were contrary to Wiegmann et al.’s
(2002) findings. In their study, there were no differences in the ceiling assessment, but
there were differences in the visibility assessment between the ―continue group‖ (pilots
who chose to continue the flight after encountering the adverse weather) and the ―divert
group‖ (pilots who chose to divert the flight after encountering the adverse weather). As
expected, the continue group was less accurate in estimating visibility than the divert
group.
In this study, the visibility and ceiling were initially designed as VFR conditions,
but the rising terrain that occurred about 16 minutes into the flight might have influenced
the participants’ estimation of ceiling more than visibility. As a result, the perceived
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ceiling height as measured by AGL might be lowered, and this could enable participants
to underestimate the weather condition as MVFR when it was actually VFR.
While pilot weather estimation as measured by visibility and weather condition
revealed no difference between the two groups, the findings did suggest that the
WeatherWise training might be helpful for GA pilots to enhance ceiling estimation ability
when they encountered adverse weather conditions. The comparison of seven outlier
participants in each group clearly showed that the WeatherWise training group showed
higher ceiling estimation accuracy than the control group. Furthermore, the control group
overestimated the ceiling, whereas the WeatherWise training group underestimated the
ceiling. This indicates that WeatherWise was successful in enabling pilots to make safer
weather-related decisions. Considering that GA-controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)
accidents account for 17 percent of all GA fatalities (FAA, 2003), it should be noted that
the WeatherWise training might be helpful to reduce CFIT accidents that occur when a
pilot tries to continue flight beneath a low ceiling and hits an obstacle or terrain.
Risk assessment was measured in terms of risk perception and risk tolerance. As
expected, there were no significant differences in the risk perception between the two
groups because participants were randomly divided into the WeatherWise training group
and the control group. Unlike the questionnaire studies with more than 400 participants
(Hunter, 2001; 2006), it was difficult to find significant differences in the number of
accidents between two groups of 20 participants in this empirical study. Specifically,
accidents are relatively rare events and any differences between the groups were unlikely
to have occurred because of sample size and power.
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Risk tolerance was measured by personal minimums and aviation safety attitude
scale. Although there was no statistical difference in the risk tolerance between the two
groups, there was a tendency for the WeatherWise training group to be more conservative
than the control group in terms of higher visibility minimums and percentages of
common practices. Thus, the hypothesis that the WeatherWise training group would
assess risks better than the control group was not supported, the WeatherWise training
group was slightly more conservative.
These findings were in line with Knecht et al.’s (2005) study. The authors
measured the effects of visibility, cloud ceiling, incentive, and personality on a pilot’s
willingness to takeoff in adverse weather. The findings indicated that personality could
not predict whether a pilot would fly in adverse weather or not.
To summarize, the WeatherWise training group exhibited higher weather
assessment with regard to ceiling estimation than the control group: however, there were
no statistical differences in the risk assessment between the two groups.

Tactical Decision Making
Pilot tactical decision making was evaluated in terms of decision accuracy and
decision confidence. The findings showed that the distance from an optimal divert point
to an actual divert point, as judged by three experienced pilots, between the two groups
was not statistically different. However, when compared with the flown distances into
adverse weather, significant differences were found between the two groups. Given that
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the WeatherWise training group would divert at or before the IMC more often than the
control group, this hypothesis was supported.
This result was in accordance with Sawyer and Shappell’s (2009) study. The
authors showed pilot participants 10 randomly ordered weather images and asked them
whether they would continue flying in the weather condition in the images. Participants
then completed the WeatherWise training program and were asked the same questions
again with randomly ordered weather images. There were no significant differences in
the decision accuracy between pilot groups, but all groups showed a significant shift in
bias, with pilots becoming more conservative (i.e., tended to view weather as more
adverse and would not fly into it) after receiving training. This suggests that while
weather training did not necessarily make pilots more accurate in their weather
assessment, it was effective in making pilots more conservative/safer in their weatherrelated decision making.
In this study, the confidence level of the control group was higher than the
WeatherWise training group, but the differences were not significant. Therefore, the
hypothesis that the WeatherWise training group would be more confident in their
decisions to divert than the control group was not supported. Notably, however, when
flight experience was considered, decision confidence of the expert group was
significantly higher than that of the control group.
Although the hypothesis on participants’ decision confidence between the two
groups was not supported, the results indicated that the decision confidence data is still
reliable because expert pilots generally show higher confidence levels than novice pilots
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(Goh & Wiegmann, 2002b; Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003a). In Goh & Wiegmann’s (2002b)
study, for example, the authors asked pilot participants to rate how good they were at
making VFR into IMC decisions during a dynamic simulation of a cross-country flight.
The results suggested that the experienced pilots were more confident in recognizing
problems and generating and implementing solutions than the inexperienced group.
To summarize, the WeatherWise training group demonstrated better decision
accuracy as measured by the flown distance into adverse weather conditions than the
control group. However, there were no significant differences in decision confidence
between the two groups.

Significance and Academic Contribution
This study clarified the concept of pilot situation assessment and tactical decision
making and comprehensively evaluated the effects of weather training on pilots in an
empirical study. In general, situation assessment is referred to as problem recognition in
the cognitive process model (Gaba et al., 1995; Patterson, 2009). In this study, pilot
situation assessment was defined as a pilot’s understanding of a current flight state and
was evaluated in terms of weather assessment and risk assessment. In previous studies,
the concept of situation assessment was used interchangeably with situation awareness
(Fracker, 1988), decision accuracy (Sawyer & Shappell, 2009), and self-assessment of
the weather conditions (Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003b; Wiegmann et al., 2002) and was
often measured only from weather assessment. Because poor weather assessment was the
major causal factor that led to the GA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) report
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(Beard & Geven, 2005), there is no doubt that weather assessment must be considered.
However, the risks associated with flying into adverse weather should also be considered
to measure pilot situation assessment (Wiggins et al., 1995) because even though pilots
correctly assess the weather conditions, they may incorrectly determine the potential risks
associated with the weather conditions. In addition, although inner competence factors
such as personality traits, attitude, and motivation are hard to train and measure
(McClellend, 1971), they also have been known to be the causal factors of weatherrelated GA accidents (Table 1.2). In contrast, pilot tactical decision making is in-flight
judgment, and was evaluated in terms of decision accuracy and decision confidence.
Another important finding was that pilots’ thinking and attitude might be
disconnected when they encountered adverse weather. In this study, the control group
flew farther into adverse weather and showed lower decision accuracy than the
WeatherWise training group (Figure 4.4; Figure 4.5). This may have been because the
control group overestimated the weather conditions more than the WeatherWise training
group. However, in the post-experiment questionnaire, the control group tended to
underestimate the weather conditions whereas the WeatherWise training group tended to
overestimate the weather conditions (Figure 4.3).
The disagreement between participants’ thinking (situation assessment) and
attitude (tactical decision making) is known from a previous study (Endsley, 2000). For
example, it is entirely possible that a pilot thoroughly understands the weather condition,
yet makes inappropriate decisions (i.e., penetrates a hole between clouds to fly the
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shortest path). When a pilot is exposed to a dynamic environment, this trend can be more
frequently found.
Another possible reason for this disagreement might be the lack of experience or
training. In this study, the WeatherWise training group received a one-time half hour
computer-based training, which may not be sufficient to change their attitude because
one’s attitude is relatively stable and consistent across situations (Chidester et al., 1991).
To measure the effects of weather training thoroughly, the WeatherWise training group
would need to replicate the training for a long period (e.g., 6 month) and then investigate
whether there are significant differences in their risk taking behavior and decision
confidence with the control group.
It should also be noted that this study proceeded one step further to understand the
effects of weather training on pilot weather decision making in a VFR into IMC. In
previous studies, the weather conditions used in WeatherWise were clearly different in
each stage; hence it was not clear whether the weather training program is effective in
gradually worsening weather conditions (Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003b). In addition, pilots
did not actually control the flight, but just saw the weather conditions presented either
through static images (Ball, 2008; Sawyer & Shappell, 2009; Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003a)
or short video clips (Coyne et al., 2008). Participants then chose an optimal divert point,
which lacks the reality of flying, and may not represent the workload imposed on pilots.
Thus, it is necessary to use a more ―real-world‖ simulation of VFR flight to understand
the underlying effects of weather recognition training on GA pilot situation assessment
and tactical decision making (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001b).
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In this study, participants flew to the destination airport as long as they did not
violate the VFR condition using the flight simulator. This is the latest study investigating
the effects of weather training on pilots’ weather-related decision making.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS

This study explored how pilots’ situation assessment and tactical decision making
were affected by weather recognition training when they were confronted with adverse
weather conditions. The findings showed that the WeatherWise training group exhibited
better weather assessment with regard to ceiling estimation and decision accuracy, as
measured by flown distance into adverse weather conditions, than the control group, but
there were no significant differences in the risk assessment and decision confidence
between the two groups. However, the WeatherWise training group did demonstrate a
conservative tendency toward flying into adverse weather conditions.
Thus, it can be concluded that the weather training was somewhat effective in
altering pilot situation assessment and tactical decision making when pilots encounter
adverse weather conditions.
The findings of this study also answered the research question whether pilots’
decision errors are associated with weather-related accidents. The findings of pilot
tactical decision making showed a positive relationship between pilots’ decision errors
and continued VFR into IMC in that flown distances of the control group were
significantly longer than the WeatherWise training group in gradually worsening weather
conditions in this study.
This study also had limitations, the first of which was that a desktop flight
simulator used in this study may not provide sufficient visual cues and simulation fidelity,
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which might influence pilots’ weather assessment. In previous empirical studies using
low-fidelity flight simulators (Coyne et al., 2008; Crognale & Krebs, 2008), pilots had
difficulty in correctly assessing weather conditions. In this study, this limitation was
partially overcome by projecting a large image of the cockpit view in front of the pilot. A
second limitation was the short length of weather training period. Participants received a
one-time half-hour weather training due to time and budget limitations, which may not be
sufficient to change pilots’ attitude toward flying into adverse weather conditions. To
fully investigate the effect of weather training, its the long term effects (e.g., 6 months)
should be explored in the following study.
The results of this study can be expanded not only to GA pilots but also to
commercial airline pilots and military pilots for various reasons. First, all pilots are
expected to acquire weather recognition skills and knowledge to ensure a safe flight,
regardless of their flight types, because the nature of changing weather conditions is
dynamic and hard to predict during the flight. Second, although those aircraft are
generally well-equipped with weather display radar or navigation systems that include a
weather map, they do not provide real-time weather information, and they sometimes
malfunction. Finally, commercial airline pilots and military pilots are more prone to press
into adverse weather conditions due to organizational culture, although the impact of
resultant accidents is more tragic than GA accidents.
In conclusion, it is expected that this study will be helpful for GA pilots to
understand the effects of weather recognition training on weather decision-making, and
eventually help them to assess a situation correctly and make a timely in-flight decision
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when they encounter adverse weather conditions. This study described causal factors (e.g.,
skill, experience, and personality) and causal hypotheses (e.g., situation assessment, risk
assessment) of weather-related accidents. Thus, it is believed that this study will help to
establish a sound foundation for weather training programs and has the potential to
reduce weather-related GA accidents by implementing weather recognition training
during basic flight training courses as well as periodic qualification training courses.
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Appendix B
Informed Consent Form

Information Concerning Participation in a Research Study
Clemson University
A study on the behaviors of general aviation pilots when fly a cross-country
flight using a flight simulator
Description of the Research and Your Participation
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Dr. Scott Shappell and Mr.
Chansik Kim. The purpose of this research is to understand the decision making of
general aviation pilots when they fly a cross-country flight using a flight simulator.
Experimental procedures
You will be briefed on the study upon arrival in the laboratory. You will sign a consent
form and will go through a background questionnaire. The questionnaire includes
information such as age, total flight time, recent flight time, cross-country flight time,
certificate, license, etc.
Your will fly a Cessna 172 on a Visual flight rules (VFR) solo cross-country flight from
the North Central West Virginia Airport (KCKB) to the Louisa County/ Freeman Field
Airport (KLKU). You will then complete a post-experiment questionnaire, be
compensated with fifty dollars for your participation, and debriefed.
The amount of time required for your participation will be about one and half hours.
Risks and Discomforts
There are no known psychological risks associated with this research. However, there is a
slight risk of low level of motion sickness due to the flight simulation. To minimize the
potential risk of motion sickness, you are allowed to discontinue the experiment
whenever you feel discomfort without any penalty. A debriefing will follow the study to
respond to any questions or concerns you might have. In addition, this time can be used
to determine the effect that the study had on you, and to deal with any problem that may
arise.
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Potential Benefits
There are no known benefits to you that would result from your participation in this
research apart from enhanced safety in overall general aviation.
Incentives
You will be compensated with fifty dollars for the participation in the study.
Protection of Confidentiality
We will do everything we can to protect your privacy. The captured data will be stored
on a password-protected computer in the Industrial Engineering Department’s Human
Computer Systems Laboratory (Freeman Hall 147). The survey questions will be kept in
a locked cabinet. The documents will be accessible only to the principal investigator and
co-investigators. Your identity will not be revealed in any publication that might result
from this study.
In rare cases, a research study will be evaluated by an oversight agency, such as the
Clemson University Institutional Review Board or the federal Office for Human
Research Protections, that would require that we share the information we collect from
you. If this happens, the information would only be used to determine if we conducted
this study properly and adequately protected your rights as a participant.
Voluntary Participation
Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate
and you may withdraw your consent to participate at any time. You will not be penalized
in any way should you decide not to participate or to withdraw from this study.
Contact Information
If you have any questions or concerns about this study or if any problems arise, please
contact Dr. Scott Shappell at (864)-656-4662 or Chansik Kim at (864)-784-3598 at
Clemson University. If you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a
research participant, please contact the Clemson University Office of Research
Compliance (ORC) at 864-656-6460 or irb@clemson.edu. If you are outside of the
Upstate South Carolina area, please use the ORC’s toll-free number, 866-297-3071.
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Consent
I have read this consent form and have been given the opportunity to ask questions.
I give my consent to participate in this study.
Participant’s signature: _________________________ Date: _________________

A copy of this consent form will be given to you.
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Appendix C
Pilot Background Questionnaire
Subject ID #:
Please fill out the following information to the best of your ability. This information will
only be used to analyze data in this study. Any personal, identifying information that is
collected will be kept confidential. Only your subject identification number should be
included on this form. Your identity will not be revealed in any publication that might
result from this study.
I.

Demographic Information

1.

Age

________

2.

Gender

Male □ / Female □

3.

Marital status: Married □ / Single □ / Other □

4.

Primary occupation:

___________

Full time □ / Part time □

5.

Other current occupation(s): ___________

Full time □ / Part time □

6.

When was the date of your last airman medical certificate?

7.

What class of medical certificate do you currently hold? I / II / III / None

8.

How many hours do you sleep in general? ________

9.

How many hours did you sleep last night? ________

____________

10. Did you take any kind of medicine during the last week? ____________
If yes, specify in detail. ___________________________________
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II.

Flight Experience

1. Place where you learned to fly (ex: Miami, FL)

___________________

2. Which year did you receive your private pilot’s license? ________
3. What certificates and ratings do you currently hold? Check all that apply.

Sport

□

Airplane Single-Engine

□

Recreational

□

Airplane Multiengine

□

Private

□

Rotorcraft

□

Commercial

□

Balloon

□

ATP

□

Airship

□

Instrument

□

Glider

□

Flight Insructor

□

Powered Lift

□

4. What type of aircraft do you typically fly? Please list primary and secondary aircrafts you
have flown.
Primary aircraft: Make / Model

_____________

Primary aircraft: Hours of time in aircraft

_____________ (estimate)

Secondary aircraft: Make / model

_____________

Secondary aircraft: Hours of time in aircraft _____________ (estimate)
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II. Flight Experience (continued)
5. Total flight hours:

________ (estimate)

6. Total VFR flight hours: ________
7. Total IFR flight hours: ________ (if you are IFR qualified)
8. Total cross-country flight hours:

________

9. Total recent 3 months cross-country flight hours: ________
10. Total recent 3 months flight hours: ________
11. Did you have experience with flying a Cessna 172? If so, please list the approximate flight
hours. ________________
12. Check which of the following categories best describe your current flying activities:
Training

□

Self-transport

□

Agriculture/ aerial work

□

Recreational

□

Commercial

□

Flights for hire

□

13. Did you get any weather training before? If yes, specify in detail.
_______________________________________________________________
14. Have you ever used X-Plane 9 flight simulation before? If so, how many hours?
Yes □

No □

Number of hours ______

15. Have you ever heard of the WeatherWise program before?
Yes □

No □

16. Have you viewed the WeatherWise CD or on-line training program?
Yes □

No □
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Appendix D
Pre-Flight Weather Briefing

Flight Weather Briefing
Flight Path: KCKB (North Central West Virginia) – KLKU (Louisa County/ Freeman Field)
ETD: 1:00EDT/ 1700Z
ETA: 3:00EDT/ 1900Z

Adverse Conditions:
No current SIGMET/AIRMETs, PIREPs
Synopsis:
Surface Map 1:00EDT/1700Z

Current Conditions:
KCKB 081653Z 18010KT 10SM SCT100 05/M10 A2997 RMK AO2
SLP120 T00540101
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Area Forecast (FA)
000
FAUS41 KKCI 081653
FA1W
BOSC FA 081653
SYNOPSIS AND VFR CLDS/WX
SYNOPSIS VALID UNTIL 091200
CLDS/WX VALID UNTIL 090600...OTLK VALID 090600-091200
.
SYNOPSIS...LOW PRES SYSTEM CNTRD OVR CNTRL CANADA COLD FRNT MVG TWD OH
VLY. HIGH PRES SYSTEM DOMNATG ESTRN SBRD. COLD FRNT FRCST ARV 09/12Z.
.
MD DE DC WV VA
APLCNS WWD...
NRN HLF.. SCT050-070. WND S 10KT. 02Z BKN040. TOPS 120. WND S 10G15KT.
OTLK...VFR.
SRN.. BKN090. TOPS 100. WND S 10G15KT. 02Z SCT-BKN090. TOPS 150.
OTLK...VFR.
E OF APLCNS...
CSTL PLAINS..
NRN HLF..SKC. WND S 7KT. OTLK...VFR.
SRN HLF..SCT-BKN090. TOPS 100. SCT -RA. WND S 10G20KT. OTLK...VFR.

Visible Satellite Image: 12:30EDT/1630Z

Destination Forecast:
KLKU 081653Z 0816/0912 18015KT P2SM BKN035
TEMPO 0818/0820 4SM -RA OVC035
FM091100 22025G20KT 4SM BKN035
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Winds Aloft:
850 mb Chart:

No current NOTAMS/TFRs
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Appendix E
Additional Pertinent Information to Use
Additional Pertinent Information
Permission to Use Data Collected in a Research Study
Clemson University
A study on the effects of weather recognition training on general aviation pilot situation
assessment and tactical decision making when confronted with adverse weather
conditions.
Thank you for participating in this study. You were told at the beginning of the study that
the purpose of this research is to understand the decision making of general aviation
pilots when they fly a cross-country flight using a flight simulator. Now that you have
completed your participation, we want to let you know that the true purpose of this study
was to measure the effects of weather recognition training on general aviation pilot
situation assessment and tactical decision making when confronted with adverse weather
condition using a flight simulator. We did not tell you the true purpose of this study
because it might have biased your performance.
If you would like a copy of the results of the study once it is completed, you may contact
Dr. Scott Shappell, the principal investigator, at hfes@clemson.edu or Mr. Chansik Kim,
a co-investigator, at ckim@clemson.edu.
Because we did not tell you the truth at the beginning of this study, you now have the
option to have us destroy the data we just collected or you can give permission for us to
keep your data and use it for research purposes. Please initial below to indicate your
choice.
_______ You may not use the data collected from me. Please destroy all data
collected from me immediately.
_______ I give permission to have my data used in this research project.
Please remember that some of your acquainted pilots also may be signed up for this study.
If they knew this study is about weather decision making, that could negatively affect the
results of this study, thereby wasting your time and ours. Therefore, we would appreciate
it if you would not share this additional information with others who may be participating
in this study.
Thank you again for your participation in this study!
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Appendix F
Pilot Post-Experiment Questionnaire
Subject ID #:
Please fill out the following information to the best of your ability. This information will
only be used to analyze data in this study. Any personal, identifying information that is
collected will be kept confidential. Only your subject identification number should be
included on this form. Your identity will not be revealed in any publication that might
result from this study.

I.

Weather Assessment

1. What do you estimate the visibility was when you made a divert decision? _____
2. What do you estimate the ceiling was when you made a divert decision?

_____

3. What do you estimate the weather condition was when the program ended?
VFR □

II.

MVFR □

IFR □

MVFR □

Decision Confidence

1. How confident were you in making your divert decision? Mark on the scale.
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2. Risk Assessment
This part is composed of critical aviation accidents (10), your personal minimums (34),
and attitudes about flying (27). Please respond to below questions based on your
previous flight experience.
1. Critical Aviation Incidents

1. How many aircraft accidents have you been in (as a
flightcrew member)?

0

1

2

3

4

5

6+

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

2. How many times have you run so low on fuel (NOT
because of equipment failures) that you were
seriously concerned about making it to an airport
before you ran out?
3. How many times have you made a precautionary or
forced landing as an airport other than your original
destination?
4. How many times have you made a precautionary or
forced landing away from an airfield?
5. How many times have you inadvertently stalled an
aircraft?
6. How many times have you become so disoriented
that you had to land or call ATC for assistance in
determining your location?
7. How many times have you had a mechanical failure
which jeopardized the safety of your flight? (i.e., nav
failure while on a cross-country; engine quitting).
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1. Critical Aviation Incidents (continued)
0

1

2

3

4

5

6+

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

8. How many times have you had an engine quit
because of fuel starvation, either because you ran
out of fuel or because of an improper pump or fuel
tank selection?
9. How many times have you flown into areas of
instrument meteorological conditions, without an
instrument rating or an instrument-qualified
aircraft?
10. How many times have you turned back or diverted
to another airport because of bad weather while on
a VFR flight?
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2. When and how do you fly?
If you wanted to make a VFR flight for some personal or business reason (not involving life
or death), what are the minimum conditions under which you would begin that flight?
Assume that you are flying from the airport you normally use and that these are the current
conditions at the departure airport and along the route of flight for a cross-country flight and
that your aircraft is not equipped for IFR operations. If the ceiling was lower than this value
or the visibility was less than this value, you would not takeoff.
Visibility (Miles)
1

2

3

4

5

6

8

10

15

11. A local (30 minute) day flight.

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

12. A local (30 minute) night flight.

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

13. A cross-country (200 mile) day flight.

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

14. A cross-country (200 mile) night flight.

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

Ceiling (Feet)
1000

1500

2000

3000

4000

5000

15. A local (30 minute) day flight.

□

□

□

□

□

□

16. A local (30 minute) night flight.

□

□

□

□

□

□

17. A cross-country (200 mile) day flight.

□

□

□

□

□

□

18. A cross-country (200 mile) night flight.

□

□

□

□

□

□
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2. When and how do you fly? (Continued)
If you are making a VFR LOCAL FLIGHT in a general aviation aircraft (e.g., Cessna 172),
what percentage of the time do you do the following?
PERCENTAGE
0

10

25

50

75

90

100

N/A

19. I get a briefing on the weather before I takeoff.

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

20. I top off and/or check my fuel before I takeoff.

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

25. I file a flight plan.

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

26. I request weather updates during flight.

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

27. I fly under VFR above overcast cloud layers.

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

30. I verify my fuel consumption rate in flight.

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

31. I use my shoulder harness.

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

21. I compute my weight and balance before I
takeoff.
22. I perform a complete pre-flight inspection.
23. I use a checklist for before-takeoff and before
landing checks.
24. I compute my expected fuel consumption
before I takeoff.

28. I fly at less than 1000 feet AGL to maintain
cloud clearance.
29. I fly at less than 500 feet AGL to maintain
cloud clearance.
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2. When and how do you fly? (Continued)
If you are making a VFR CROSS-COUNTRY FLIGHT in a general aviation aircraft (e.g.,
Cessna 172), what percentage of the time do you do the following?
PERCENTAGE
0

10

25

50

75

90

100

N/A

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

43. I verify my fuel consumption rate in flight.

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

44. I use my shoulder harness.

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

32. I get a briefing on the weather before I
takeoff.
33. I top off and/or check my fuel tanks before I
takeoff.
34. I compute my weight and balance before I
takeoff.
35. I perform a complete pre-flight inspection.
36. I use a checklist for before-takeoff and beforelanding checks.
37. I compute my expected fuel consumption
before I takeoff.
38. I file a flight plan.
39. I request weather updates for my route and
destination during flight.
40. I fly under VFR above overcast cloud layers.
41. I fly at less than 1,000 feet AGL to maintain
cloud clearance.
42. I fly at less than 500 feet AGL to maintain
cloud clearance.
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3. Attitudes About Flying
1: Strongly Disagree, 2: Disagree, 3: Neither agree nor disagree, 4: Agree, 5: Strongly Agree
1

2

3

4

5

SA

A

N

D

SD

45. I would duck below minimums to get home.

□

□

□

□

□

46. I am capable of instrument flight.

□

□

□

□

□

47. I am a very careful pilot.

□

□

□

□

□

48. I never feel stressed when flying.

□

□

□

□

□

49. The rules controlling flying are much too strict.

□

□

□

□

□

50. I am a very capable pilot.

□

□

□

□

□

51. I am so careful that I will never have an accident.

□

□

□

□

□

52. I am very skillful on controls.

□

□

□

□

□

53. I know aviation procedures very well.

□

□

□

□

□

54. I deal with stress very well.

□

□

□

□

□

55. It is riskier to fly at night than during the day.

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

57. I have a thorough knowledge of my aircraft.

□

□

□

□

□

58. Aviation weather forecasts are usually accurate.

□

□

□

□

□

59. I am a very cautious pilot.

□

□

□

□

□

60. The pilot should have more control over how he/she flies.

□

□

□

□

□

61. Usually your first response is the best response.

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

56. Most of the time accidents are caused by things beyond the
pilot’s control.

62. I find it easy to understand the weather information I get
before flights.
63. You should decide quickly and then make adjustment later.
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3. Attitudes About Flying (continued)
1: Strongly Disagree, 2: Disagree, 3: Neither agree nor disagree, 4: Agree, 5: Strongly Agree
1

2

3

4

5

SA

A

N

D

SD

□

□

□

□

□

65. I fly enough to maintain my proficiency.

□

□

□

□

□

66. I know how to get help from ATC if I get into trouble.

□

□

□

□

□

67. There are few situations I couldn’t get out of.

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

64. It is very unlikely that a pilot of my ability would have an
accident.

68. If you don’t push yourself and the aircraft a little, you’ll
never know what you could do.
69. I often feel stressed when flying in or near weather.
70. Sometimes you just have to depend on luck to get you
through.
71. Speed is more important than accuracy during an
emergency.
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Appendix G
Weather Condition Estimation
1. All the Participants
Participant

Estimated weather condition

Assigned score

Weather training

Adjusted rank

1

MVFR

2

No

16.5

2

MVFR

2

Yes

16.5

3

MVFR

2

Yes

16.5

4

MVFR

2

No

16.5

5

MVFR

2

No

16.5

6

MVFR

2

Yes

16.5

7

MVFR

2

Yes

16.5

8

MVFR

2

No

16.5

9

IFR

3

Yes

35.5

10

MVFR

2

Yes

16.5

11

LIFR

4

No

40

12

MVFR

2

No

16.5

13

MVFR

2

Yes

16.5

14

IFR

3

No

35.5

15

IFR

3

No

35.5

16

MVFR

2

Yes

16.5

17

IFR

3

No

35.5

18

IFR

3

Yes

35.5

19

IFR

3

Yes

35.5

20

MVFR

2

Yes

16.5
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Participant

Estimated weather condition

Assigned score

Weather training

Adjusted rank

21

MVFR

2

No

16.5

22

VFR

1

Yes

1

23

MVFR

2

Yes

16.5

24

MVFR

2

Yes

16.5

25

MVFR

2

No

16.5

26

MVFR

2

No

16.5

27

MVFR

2

No

16.5

28

MVFR

2

Yes

16.5

29

MVFR

2

No

16.5

30

MVFR

2

No

16.5

31

MVFR

2

Yes

16.5

32

MVFR

2

Yes

16.5

33

MVFR

2

Yes

16.5

34

MVFR

2

No

16.5

35

MVFR

2

Yes

16.5

36

MVFR

2

Yes

16.5

37

IFR

3

No

35.5

38

IFR

3

No

35.5

39

MVFR

2

No

16.5

40

MVFR

2

No

16.5
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Participants’ weather condition estimat2ions were calculated using the Mann-Whitney U
test.
H0: The median of weather condition estimation between the two groups are equal.
H1: The median of weather condition estimation between the two groups are not equal.

Participants were assigned to a rank according to their weather condition estimation as
bellow (VFR: 1, MVFR: 2, IFR: 3, LIFR: 4).
∑

(

) = 16.5(16) + 35.5(3) + 1(1) = 371.5

∑

(

) = 16.5(14) + 40(1) + 35.3(3) = 448.5

= 20,

=20

Employing below equations, the values of
=
=

and

are computed.

(

)

-∑

= 20*20 +

– 371.5 = 238.5

(

)

-∑

= 20*20 +

– 448.5 = 161.5

Critical U value for

in the Mann-Whitney U Statistic table.

Since the test statistics of U = 161.5 is greater than the critical U value of U = 127,
retained.
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is

2. 14 Outlier Participants
Participant

Estimated weather condition

Assigned score

Weather training

Adjusted rank

2

MVFR

2

Yes

5.5

3

LIFR

4

Yes

5.5

6

IFR

3

Yes

5.5

8

IFR

3

No

5.5

11

IFR

3

No

14

14

MVFR

2

No

12

15

MVFR

2

No

12

16

MVFR

2

Yes

5.5

17

MVFR

2

No

12

26

MVFR

2

No

5.5

28

MVFR

2

Yes

5.5

31

MVFR

2

Yes

5.5

33

MVFR

2

No

5.5

36

MVFR

2

Yes

5.5

Participants’ weather condition estimations were calculated using the Mann-Whitney U
test.
H0: The median of weather condition estimation between the two groups are equal.
H1: The median of weather condition estimation between the two groups are not equal.

Participants were assigned to a rank according to their weather condition estimation as
bellow (VFR: 1, MVFR: 2, IFR: 3, LIFR: 4).
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∑

(

∑

(

) = 5.5(7) = 38.5
) = 5.5(3) + 12(3) + 14(11) = 66.5

= 7,

=7

Employing below equations, the values of
=
=

and

are computed.

(

)

-∑

= 7*7 +

– 38.5 = 38.5

(

)

-∑

= 7*7 +

– 66.5 = 10.5

Critical U value for

in the Mann-Whitney U Statistic table.

Since the test statistics of U = 10.5 is greater than the critical U value of U = 8,
retained.
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Appendix H
Personal Minimums
1. Visibility (Status Miles)
Control group

WeatherWise training group

4.35

4.6

6.95

7.8

7.45

6.4

9.8

9.6

Mean

7.14

7.10

Standard Deviation

2.23

2.12

Standard Error

1.12

1.06

A local (30 minutes)
day flight
A local (30 minutes) night
flight
A cross-country (200 mile)
day flight
A cross-country (200 mile)
night flight.

ANOVA: Single Factor
SUMMARY
Groups
Column 1
Column 2

Count
4
4

ANOVA
Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups

SS
0.002812
28.47188

Total

28.47469

Sum
28.55
28.4

df
1
6

Average
7.1375
7.1

Variance
4.997292
4.493333

MS
0.002812
4.745313

F
0.000593

7

F (1, 6) = 0.0006, p = 0.98, nonsignificant.
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P-value
0.981367

F crit
5.987378

2. Ceiling (Feet)
Control group

WeatherWise training group

2475

2200

3625

3600

3500

3550

4350

4400

Mean

3487.5

3437.5

Standard Deviation

772.04

912.3

Standard Error

386.02

456.15

A local (30 minutes)
day flight
A local (30 minutes) night
flight
A cross-country (200 mile)
day flight
A cross-country (200 mile)
night flight.

ANOVA: Single Factor
SUMMARY
Groups
Column 1
Column 2

Count
4
4

ANOVA
Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups

SS
5000
4285000

Total

4290000

Sum
13950
13750

df
1
6

Average
3487.5
3437.5

Variance
596041.7
832291.7

MS
5000
714166.7

F
0.007001

7

F (1, 6) = 0.007, p = 0.94, nonsignificant.
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P-value
0.936038

F crit
5.987378

3. Common Practices in a VFR Local Flight (%)
Control group

WeatherWise training group

Get weather briefing
before take off

79

87.75

Top off/check fuel tanks

98.25

100

Compute weight/balance

51.25

55.25

Perform complete preflight inspection
Use a checklist for landing
& take off
Compute expected fuel
consumption

95

99.5

85.5

92.75

84.5

94

File a flight plan

28

31

Request weather updates

32.5

32.5

Fly VFR above clouds

79

84.75

83.75

90.25

99

98.75

59.5

77.75

Use shoulder harness

89.5

100

Mean

74.21

80.33

Standard Deviation

23.89

24.75

Standard Error

6.63

6.86

Fly below 1,000 AGL
under clouds
Fly below 500 AGL under
clouds
Verify fuel consumption in
flight
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ANOVA: Single Factor
SUMMARY
Groups
Column 1
Column 2

Count
13
13

ANOVA
Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups

SS
243.0865
14198.9

Total

14441.99

Sum
964.75
1044.25

df
1
24

Average
74.21154
80.32692

Variance
570.613
612.629

MS
243.0865
591.621

F
0.410882

25

F (1, 24) = 0.41, p = 0.53, nonsignificant.
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P-value
0.527596

F crit
4.259677

Common Practices in a VFR Cross-Country Flight (%)
Control group

WeatherWise training group

Get weather briefing
before take off

89.5

99.5

Top off/check fuel tanks

94.5

99.5

Compute weight/balance

65.5

90

95

100

86.5

95.25

93.25

92

File a flight plan

58.5

70

Request weather updates

60

59

Fly VFR above clouds

70.75

76.5

Perform complete preflight inspection
Use a checklist for landing
& take off
Compute expected fuel
consumption

Fly below 1,000 AGL
under clouds
Fly below 500 AGL under
clouds
Verify fuel consumption in
flight

81.5

88.25

98.75

97.5

75.25

82.5

Use shoulder harness

89

100

Mean

81.38

87.69

Standard Deviation

13.94

13.23

Standard Error

3.87

3.67
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ANOVA: Single Factor
SUMMARY
Groups
Column 1
Column 2

Count
13
13

ANOVA
Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups

SS
258.6154
4435.471

Total

4694.087

Sum
1058
1140

df
1
24

Average
81.38462
87.69231

Variance
194.4856
175.137

MS
258.6154
184.8113

F
1.399348

25

F (1, 24) = 1.40, p = 0.25, nonsignificant.
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P-value
0.248419

F crit
4.259677

Appendix I
Screenshots of Weather Conditions along the Flight Path
1.
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